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ABSTRACT 
This thesis traces Pakistan's strategy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) against India 
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and analyzes the gains and losses to 
Pakistan arising from its implementation. LIC was primarily intended to wrest 
control of the state of J&K from India, to weaken India and its army, and to 
mobilize international support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. While this 
strategy had some initial success, it slowly began to damage key political, 
economic and social structures within Pakistan. The thesis looks at both the 
gains and the pitfalls of LIC, and its impact on Pakistan’s “well being,” as 
measured by its prosperity, stability and international stature from the periods 
1971 to 1989 and 1990 to 2009. The analysis shows that on balance, LIC is 
doing Pakistan more harm than any good. The thesis concludes by suggesting 
policy options open to Pakistan, the United States and India. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
There is a general acceptance that when conventional military capability 
does not yield results, states resort to waging Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to 
achieve their desired end results.1 Three times, Pakistan attempted to wrest 
control of Kashmir from India through military means and failed. It then renewed 
its experiments with LIC, as a way to achieve the goal of gaining control of 
Kashmir. Pakistan met with considerable success in the beginning, in terms of 
engaging a large part of the Indian Army, and was also able to keep the Kashmir 
issue alive in the international forum. It has only been over the last two decades 
that Pakistan began to feel the brunt of its LIC policies itself. Today Pakistan 
feels the impact in terms of sectarian conflicts, suicide bombings, Islamic 
radicalization, loss of civilian control, and a general sense of lawlessness in the 
state. This thesis will address the questions of how Pakistan’s strategy of LIC in 
Jammu and Kashmir in India is impacting the general well-being of Pakistan, and 
if Pakistan has or lost gained from LIC in terms of its stability, economy, and 
international stature? 
B. UNDERSTANDING LIC INITIATED BY PAKISTAN 
Pakistan as a country generates intense debate and discussion, both 
among social scientists and security experts. The path that Pakistan takes in the 
next decade or two will have a direct impact on regional stability and, in turn, on 
world peace. Stephen Cohen argues that the “failure of Pakistan would be 
multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a 
world that craves for order and predictability.”2 Events in Pakistan also have a 
                                            
1 V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 15, (December 1992), 248. 
2 Stephen Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, (Summer, 2002), 
118. 
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direct influence on the future course of events in the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT), now spearheaded by the United States with the help of many countries 
around the world.   
 Pakistan is considered by many to be the most dangerous foreign policy 
problem facing the United States, as it is an unstable, radicalized, and nuclear-
capable country.3 Experts also consider Pakistan to be the world’s most active 
sponsor of terrorism, with the possible exception of Iran.4 Pakistan represents an 
especially grave strategic threat to the international system because of its 
ambiguous approach to viewing and tackling terrorism, and because of its unique 
interpretation of who constitutes a “freedom fighter.” A statement in the 2002 
National Security Strategy of the United States suggests that it is at a greater risk 
from failing states than from conquering states, and this has brought a renewed 
focus on this alleged global menace.5 Experts have pointed out this danger. 
Ganguly and Kapur, for example, write that “many high-profile terrorist incidents 
ranging from the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington to 
the July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London to the November 2008 assault on 
Mumbai have had direct connections to individuals and groups operating in 
Pakistan.”6 Riedel notes that  
Pakistan almost uniquely is both a major victim of terrorism and a 
major sponsor of terrorism. It has been the scene of horrific acts of 
terrorist violence, including the murder of Benazir Bhutto in late 
2007, and it has been one of the most prolific state sponsors of 
terror aimed at advancing its national security interests.7  
                                            
3 Larry P Goodson, “Pakistan the Most Dangerous Place in the World,” Strategic Studies Institute, (July 
2009), 1. 
4 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 155. 
5 Aidan Hehir, “Is Pakistan a Failed State,” Pakistan Security Research Unit, No. 15, (June 2007), 1. 
6 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," The 
Washington Quarterly, (January 2010), 47. 
7 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” The American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, (July 2008), 31. 
 3
 Under these circumstances, it becomes important to assess the LIC’s 
impact on Pakistan. Is Pakistan gaining from this policy of LIC, or is it losing?  If 
indeed Pakistan is gaining from this policy, then it has the potential to set a 
dangerous precedent for future state actors with a similar intent. The strategy of 
a smaller, aggrieved state beginning an LIC against a larger state can become 
the norm, and this has the potential to upset the fine balance of power that exists 
in the present world order. On the other hand, if the strategy of supporting an LIC 
is doing more harm than good, then it is incumbent on the host nation and the 
international community to recognize this and act upon it in order to initiate 
corrective measures. In either case, an answer to this question is vital for 
Pakistan in particular and to the whole world in general, as it has direct 
implications on peace and stability in Pakistan and the rest of the world.   
 Relations between Pakistan and India have remained strained since 
independence on various issues, with the most contentious of these being 
Kashmir. They have fought three full-scale wars – in 1947 and 1965 over 
Kashmir, and in 1971 on both fronts, which resulted in the formation of 
Bangladesh, and, finally, a localized war in 1999 in the Kargil Sector. Pakistan 
was beaten back each time, and has since looked at alternate options that will 
permit it to stop this one-sided war and have winning options. “Pakistan has 
always faced a strategic dilemma: it is a big enough state to play the game, but 
not big enough to win. Pakistan repeatedly underestimated the capability of the 
Indian Armed Forces and the possible responses of the government of India to 
military challenges. To overcome this handicap, Pakistan played a masterstroke 
by initiating an effective, well coordinated, and volatile low intensity operations 
against India in Jammu and Kashmir.”8 Commenting on the assessment of India 
by Pakistan, Ganguly argues: 
[t]he anti-Indian and chauvinistic ideology of the authoritarian 
Pakistani state repeatedly contributed to a flawed assessment of 
India’s military capabilities and will. Such chauvinist propaganda 
                                            
8 V.K. Sood, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Source of Third-World Instability," 239. 
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was able to thrive within Pakistani state because of the arrested 
development of democratic institutions and prolonged periods of 
authoritarian military rule.9 
 Pakistan saw fomenting trouble in Jammu and Kashmir and other North 
Eastern states of India as a “low-cost, high-gain option.” In effect, sponsoring 
insurgency in India was seen as a means of balancing the asymmetries (through 
the philosophy of a war by thousand cuts) between the two countries.10  
President Asif Ali Zardari, in a meeting with retired senior officials, is said to have 
admitted that the terrorist outfits were "deliberately created and nurtured as a 
policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives."11 Former Pakistani 
President General Musharraf, in a recent interview with German magazine Der 
Spiegel, made the candid confession that the “Pakistan government trained 
terrorists against India and pushed them into Jammu and Kashmir.”12 In the past 
decade, Pakistan has slowly moved from complete deniability of its hand in 
sponsoring terrorism in India to partial acceptance of its culpability albeit under 
pressure from United States of America. So there is a general acceptance that 
state-sponsored terrorism is being attempted by Pakistan across national 
boundaries in India.13 As a recent Rand Corporation report argued, “the Use of 
militant groups, including the Taliban, has remained an important instrument for 
Pakistan’s security forces in its regional strategy.”14 
                                            
9 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001) 7. 
10 Peter Chalk, "Pakistan's Role in Kashmir Insurgency," Jane's Intelligence Review, 
(September 2001),  1. 
11 Policy Research Group, July 2009, http://policyresearchgroup.com/pakistan/330.html 
(accessed May 15, 2010). 
12 Indrani Bagchi, Pak Trained Terrorists to fight India: Musharraf, October 6, 2010, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pak-trained-terrorists-to-fight-India-
MUSharraf/articleshow/6694651.cms (accessed October 12, 2010). 
13 Raju G.C. Thomas, "India's Security Environment, towards the year 2000," Strategic 
Studies Institute, (July 1996), 9. 
14 Chistine Fair, Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State, Monograph 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), xiv. 
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Pakistan was also involved in aiding, with the help of the CIA, the Taliban 
insurgents in Afghanistan during the Russian occupation of that country in the 
1980s. It continued to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan even after the Soviets 
left the country in 1989. Post “9/11,” when the United States entered Afghanistan, 
Pakistan by virtue of its geographic position and certain choices made by its 
leaders became a frontline state in the GWOT. Pakistan began fighting the 
Taliban, albeit reluctantly as they needed the United States’ support and 
economic aid. This change in its stand created immense unease and distrust 
between the government and the Muslim clergy (who controlled the insurgent 
and terrorist groups). The launching of an LIC in India and the support of the 
United States in its GWOT were defining moments for Pakistan, as these led to 
the beginning of Jihad within Pakistan and to a spiraling state of instability. 
Pakistan had never been at the center of focus before, as its actions in 
South Asia impacted regionally and Western experts largely ignored it and its 
actions. The tragic events of 9/11 and Pakistan’s involvement in the GWOT in 
“partnership with United States, have brought it diplomatic support, political 
protection, international legitimacy and immense sums of aid.”15 “Today Pakistan 
is clearly both part of the problem, and the solution to the threat of terrorism 
facing the United States.”16 Along with this came intense scrutiny of Pakistan’s 
actions on the ground by security experts around the world, who were keen to 
know whether Pakistan supported the GWOT or was against it. The last decade 
has seen more scholarly articles on the situation in Pakistan, and its impact on 
regional and global stability, than in the previous two decades. A detailed study 
of LIC initiated by Pakistan is important, as it provides an understanding of the 
impact of LIC on a weaker state when it attempts to take on a stronger 
 
 
                                            
15 Robert M. Hathaway, "Leverage and Largesse: Pakistan's post-9/11 Partership with 
America," Contemporary South Asia, (March 2008), 11. 
16 Ashley J. Tellis, "U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," The Washington 
Quarterly, (Winter 2004), 97. 
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adversary, Using LIC as a state strategy. Findings from this research can give a 
broad idea of what kind of results the future perpetrators of LIC are likely to have 
under similar circumstances. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
My thesis’s hypothesis is that one of the main causes for the breakdown of 
political, economic, and social structures in Pakistan in the last two decades is a 
consequence of Pakistan’s policy of directing LIC, i.e., aiding, abetting, and 
sponsoring terror and insurgency in its neighboring countries as a conscious 
strategy. Some of Pakistan’s important goals in adopting the strategy of LIC have 
been: 
• To weaken India.17 
• To tie down the Indian Army so that it does not pose a significant 
conventional threat and also be able to use the Jihadists to further 
their aims in case Pakistan launches a conventional offensive into 
Kashmir.18 
• To put international pressure on India to come to the negotiation 
table, on terms favorable to Pakistan, with the ultimate aim of 
wresting the state of Kashmir from India’s control19   
Pakistan-backed radical groups have undermined the governance in 
Kashmir and tied down thousands of Indian Army troops.20 While this apparently 
supports the rationale that aiding and abetting terrorism is cheaper than 
developing conventional military capabilities, it has also led to the “creation of 
multiple centers of power in Pakistan, meaning that the state has abdicated a 
                                            
17 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections, 298. 
18 Ibid., 174. 
19 Ibid., 
20 Ibid., 156. 
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large portion of its ‘monopoly on violence,’ in the Weberian sense.”21 According 
to Gill, “[a]midst multiple insurgencies, there is current uncertainty over what 
constitutes state leadership in Pakistan. President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister 
Yousuf Raza Gilani, the Chief of Army Staff  General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the 
ISI, and the military establishment, are all competing for power, with each of 
these players further complicating the situation in the pursuit of divergent 
personal and partisan agendas.”22 Within the complex web of issues confronting 
Pakistan, there is a need to understand how the desire of Pakistan to wrest 
Kashmir from India, and to provide itself strategic depth in Afghanistan, is 
impacting its domestic and international policies.    
Gregory believes that “Pakistan has been termed a persistently failing 
state, that is, a state which exhibits many of the features of a ‘failed state,’ but 
somehow manages not to collapse and disintegrate.”23 Pakistan, in spite of its 
large-scale involvement in sponsoring terrorism, is “off the hook” because of its 
support to the United States in Afghanistan. Accordingly, Pakistan is regarded as 
an ally by the United States, receiving both massive funding and little 
international criticism.24 This U.S.–Pakistan relationship has slightly skewed the 
relationship between state sponsorship of insurgency and its possible effects on 
the host country. 
The radicalization of Pakistan, which began over three decades ago, has 
now reached a stage where it has become self-sustaining and there is a 
“spontaneous groundswell of Islamic zeal.”25 By supporting the cause of 
                                            
21 Khaled Ahmed, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, March 8, 2010, http://www.boell-
pakistan.org/web/116-548.html (accessed on May 13, 2010). 
22 K.P.S. Gill, Pakistan Assessment 2009, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan 
(accessed May 13, 2010). 
23 Shaun Gregory and Christine Fair, "The Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan," Pakistan 
Security Research Unit, (April 2008), 3. 
24 Barry Rubin, "The Rubin Report," http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2009/12/terrorism-and-
state-sposorship-n0t.html (accessed February 21, 2010). 
25 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan - the Threat from Within,” Pakistan Security Research Unit, 
No.13 (May 2007), 3. 
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jihadists, Stephen Cohen believes, Pakistan has weakened its own stability, as 
many Islamists do not separate domestic politics from their actions in 
Afghanistan and Kashmir.26 The prized policies of “Jihad” and “Proxy Warfare” 
have become the bane of Pakistan, as its own citizens and the Army has begun 
to bear the brunt of attacks by religious militant groups. The strategy of initiating 
LIC has made Pakistan internally unstable and has grossly reduced its foreign 
policy options for getting closer to Kashmir. The events of 9/11 and Pakistan’s 
subsequent support for the United States’ GWOT has further upset its strategy 
and grossly reduced its options to fight a successful LIC against India. Today, 
Pakistan is under intense pressure to rein in the militants within its own borders, 
and also to stop all kinds of support to militant groups operating out of its soil in 
both India and Afghanistan. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To analyze the effect of LIC on Pakistan, it is first necessary to trace their 
prevalence over a period of time, and then to study its growth patterns along with 
its main causes, and its effects on Pakistan. For the purpose of comparative 
study, the period of Pakistan’s involvement in LIC will be divided into two parts. 
The first part covers the period from 1971 to 1989, when LIC was not prevalent in 
Kashmir, and the second part, from 1990 to 2009, covers the period when 
Pakistan unleashed the full force of LIC against India, exploiting the opportunity 
provided by India in Kashmir. The year of 1989 was a defining moment, when 
Pakistan shifted the entire might of the Jihadists from Afghanistan in the West to 
Kashmir in the East, in order to prosecute LIC. Commenting on Pakistan’s 
footprint in Kashmir, Kapur states: 
[a]lthough the Kashmir issue had appeared to subside during the 
1970s and the early 1980s, by 1989 it was once again a major 
source of tension, with the Pakistan backed insurgency wracking 
                                            
26 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), 34. 
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Indian Kashmir, and India flooding the territory with hundreds of 
thousands of security forces in an attempt to crush the uprising.27 
To analyze the effect of LIC, it is necessary to see its impact on the “well-
being” of Pakistan, in the two periods of time discussed above, i.e., from 1971-
1989, when LIC were not present, and 1990 to 2009, when the policy of LIC was 
in full force. An evaluation of any country’s well-being would take into account its 
prosperity, stability, and international stature. Prosperity would encompass the 
study of a nation’s GDP, level of poverty, human development index, the state of 
education, and opportunities for intellectual freedom. Stability would involve the 
study of the nature of government, regime changes, effective law and order, and 
judicial independence. International stature may be gauged by access to 
international organizations, and the confidence of multinational and national 
companies from the point of view of investments. An appraisal of the above-
mentioned components of governance will provide us with a rough assessment 
of the well-being of Pakistan.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In Chapter I, the research question and its importance are discussed, as 
are the hypothesis and methodology of this work. 
Chapter II explains the issues of state sponsorship of 
insurgency/terrorism, LIC, and Islamic radicalization; it will then attempt to 
establish a link among the three. State sponsorship of insurgency/terrorism, while 
not a new phenomenon, was reinvented by Pakistan in order to meet its strategic 
needs. 
Chapter III will outline the genesis of the problem in South Asia. It will 
include the traumatic division of India and Pakistan’s evolution as a state. It will 
cover the India–Pakistan Wars in some detail, and will then attempt to analyze 
how these events led Pakistan to discover the power of LIC as a low cost–high 
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gain option. The chapter will also address other important domestic and regional 
events such as the Punjab militancy, the Jammu and Kashmir militancy, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the events in South Asia post- 9/11, which 
had an impact on Pakistan and its involvement in LIC in both Afghanistan and 
Kashmir. 
 Chapter IV will look in detail at both the advantages and the pitfalls of 
Pakistan’s strategy of LIC and their effect on the well-being of the state, as 
measured by its prosperity, stability, and international stature. A comparative 
analysis of the period from 1971 to 1989, and then from 1990 to 2009, will be 
carried out in depth to see how some measures of well-being changed during this 
period. 
 Chapter V will identify policy implications for the key actors in the region, 
i.e., Pakistani political leaders, Pakistan’s military, the United States, and India, 
with respect to Pakistan’s using LIC as conscious state strategy. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING LIC, STATE SPONSORSHIP OF 
INSURGENCY AND ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN PAKISTAN’S 
CONTEXT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The desire of Pakistan to wage LIC stems from the issue of its non-
acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir. Pakistan genuinely believed that India 
had set in motion a process to completely amalgamate Kashmir into India and 
end its special status.28 Pakistan accordingly made three failed attempts—in 
1947, 1965, and 1971—to alter the situation by launching conventional 
operations. Because Pakistan lacked the military capability to achieve its desired 
end state, it slowly tilted towards using LIC as a possible alternative. Ganguly 
and Kapur further clarify:  
[t]hroughout its history, Pakistan has deliberately used non-state 
actors as a strategy of asymmetric warfare against stronger 
adversaries such as India and the Soviet Union. Islamist militants 
were armed and trained by elements of the Pakistani military and 
intelligence services, and funded by a sophisticated international 
financial network. This enabled Pakistan to attrite Indian and Soviet 
resources via proxy, without having to face either country in a direct 
conflict.29 
LIC is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in one form or another since 
the establishment of organized states.30 V.K. Sood explains that “LIC as a 
combination of racial, tribal, religious and regional struggles, […] which is 
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manifested primarily in insurgency, subversion, and terrorism.”31 Shultz 
describes it as “a confrontation short of full scale war.”32  
Any state, which intends to wage LIC in a neighboring country, needs to 
meet certain preconditions. The most important of these is the political will of the 
host nation to prosecute LIC against the other. The second is the existence of a 
suitable situation in the target state that is amenable to exploitation. The link 
between these two preconditions is the availability of a motivated population that 
is ready to take the fight across borders. The key question is, “how do you 
motivate your population to take the battle across the borders?” In the context of 
Pakistan, it was Islam and the Islamic radicalization that came to their aid.  
Pakistan was able to leverage the Islamic identity of the nation in order to 
mobilize radical elements within Islam to take up the cause of jihad in Kashmir in 
the 1990s. Pakistan had already tasted the efficacy of jihad, which it had carried 
out in the 1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan, with the active support of the 
United States. It was confident of its ability to replicate the same success in 
Kashmir, as India presented a ripe opportunity in terms of a disturbed internal 
situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s. Two other factors 
that further facilitated an effective LIC by Pakistan were the geographic co-
location of India and the difficult mountainous terrain of Kashmir. During the 
1990s, Pakistan mobilized all it had in terms of statecraft, Islamic radicals, 
mujahideen, sectarian outfits, excess weapons of Afghan war, and sufficient 
funds to wage an LIC against India in Kashmir, with the aim of undermining 
India’s control over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. To comprehend Pakistan’s 
position on the issue of its overt and covert support to Kashmiri separatists, it is 
important to first understand the meaning of terms such as insurgency, state 
sponsorship of insurgency, and LIC. 
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B. INSURGENCY, STATE SPONSORSHIP OF INSURGENCY, AND LIC 
1. Insurgency   
To understand LIC and state sponsorship of insurgency, it is necessary to 
first understand, what is insurgency? Insurgency, simply stated, is an armed 
rebellion against a duly constituted government. Insurgents engage in a range of 
activities including guerrilla warfare, political mobilization, and even acts of 
terrorism. In the classic sense, “terrorism in this context is a specific tactic that 
insurgents use, as part of a broader strategy to control a particular geographic 
area. So, terrorism is an auxiliary mode of violence rather than an exclusive 
one.”33 Organizations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri 
Lanka, Hezbollah of Lebanon, or the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) in India, typically come under the category of insurgencies. The progress 
of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations can cause some of these 
organizations to lean more towards being terrorist organizations, especially when 
they lose sight of some of the basic aims of carrying out an insurgency. 
2. State Sponsorship of Insurgency 
State sponsorship of insurgency as an instrument of state policy is not a 
new phenomenon, and the same was widely used as a foreign policy tool during 
the Cold War.34 “Superpowers like the United States and the erstwhile Soviet 
Union regularly backed their favored proxies, often transforming local quarrels 
into international contests. The end of Cold War saw a change in the nature and 
scope of state sponsorship of insurgency. The scene of activity shifted from the 
big players to smaller states like Iran, Angola, Uganda and Pakistan, which were 
to devote far less amounts of money and resources to their proxies.”35 State 
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sponsorship of insurgency, unlike other types of support, has the ability to sustain 
a movement for a much longer period and has greater power of deniability if the 
support they lend is well calibrated.  
3. Implications of State Support to Insurgencies    
 A state retains the capacity to provide various types of aid, including 
manpower, material, and money, to insurgents. The state also retains the 
capability to provide fighters with a place to train and organize, in addition to 
providing diplomatic support and representation in international forums.36 At the 
other end of the spectrum, states could merely be providing moral support, which 
in modern times is sufficient enough for many insurgencies to thrive. According to 
Byman, “of the 74 insurgencies active since 1991 that were surveyed for a report, 
44 received state support and that, in our judgment, was significant or critical to 
the survival and success of those movements.”37 This clearly highlights the 
power and efficacy of state sponsorship of insurgency or terrorism and its ability 
to provide the required momentum to these organizations. 
 An insurgency can benefit immensely from both state and non-state 
supporters, as it has the ability to prolong war, increase the scale and lethality of 
its struggle, and may even transform a civil conflict into an international war. 
4. State Sponsorship of Insurgency as a Strategy   
 Before the end of the Cold War, it was the superpowers that were most 
intimately involved in aiding and abetting insurgencies around the world. In the 
absence of this rivalry, support for insurgencies is now most often provided by 
local governments, which border the country in which the insurgents are fighting. 
Geographic co-location provides a large number of advantages to the sponsoring 
state in terms of logistics, costs, and perception management. In the case of 
Pakistan, it was the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, which was the 
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lead agency, that shaped the character of the LIC in Kashmir and the rest of 
India. “Pakistan, one of the most generous sponsors of insurgent groups in the 
1990s, provided tens of millions of dollars to its favored movements.”38 Pakistan 
supported a large number of insurgent groups in Kashmir and Bangladesh, as 
well as the Taliban in Afghanistan, in order to checkmate the advantages that its 
neighbor India had in terms of its size, power, and economy. Thus, “insurgencies 
essentially are wars by other means. Support to rebel movements is therefore 
seen as an alternative and a less direct means of weakening and undermining 
enemies or rivals.”39 Pakistan’s desire to annex Kashmir from India led it to adopt 
LIC as a conscious strategy. LIC, as a means of warfare, becomes particularly 
attractive when other types of engagement become either costly or impractical. 
Another important advantage of LIC is the ability of a nation to wage this kind of 
warfare over prolonged periods of time, with little or no cost to itself, but imposing 
substantial costs on the opposing party.  
5. Why Support Insurgencies 
a. Prestige 
  Support of insurgencies can lend an air of prestige to both weak 
and strong regimes; this is especially true when the country is going through a 
period of domestic turmoil. “This motivation is particularly important if the leader 
or the regime has ambitions outside its immediate neighborhood. Many Arab 
states provided support to the PLO to strengthen their Arab nationalist 
credentials.”40 Pakistan’s support of the Muslim Kashmiri nationalists can be 
seen from the point of view of its desire to be a leader in the Muslim Ummah, or 
"Community of the Believers" (ummat al-mu'minin). According to Byman, “[o]ne 
benefit Pakistan gains from fomenting unrest in Afghanistan and Kashmir is the 
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prestige derived from championing Islam, a benefit of growing importance for 
Islamabad given the importance of political Islam in Pakistan today.”41 
b. Ensuring Influence within the Opposition 
  Many states support insurgencies or dissident movements in 
neighboring countries only to checkmate opposition parties, “who otherwise could 
adopt goals or policies that are hostile to its interests.”42 States can also attempt 
to change the ultimate goal of an insurgency by manipulating the kind and 
intensity of aid to different insurgent groups operating in the target country. 
Pakistan, which initially helped the indigenous insurgent group the JKLF, slowly 
weaned away its support, as its overall agenda differed from that of the JKLF. 
“Islamabad prefers to aid those insurgents whose agendas squared more directly 
with its own goals.”43 
c. Internal Security    
  Another interesting aspect of state sponsors “is the use of 
insurgents against their own dissidents or other antigovernment groups.”44 
Pakistan has often used this tool to settle political scores with opposition parties. 
Both Generals Zia and Musharraf employed it to keep political opponents in 
check when other methods failed. Pakistan has also used this strategy in 
Afghanistan, to prop up groups in Taliban, which were in conformity with its own 
ideologies. 
d. Irredentism 
  Overt irredentism, while rare, can still be a great source of 
motivation for states to support insurgencies.45 Byman observes, “homogeneous 
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states, unlike governments with heterogeneous composition, are more likely to 
support the cause for insurgencies, with the aim of acquiring territory that is 
home to the same ethnic group.”46 Pakistan has accordingly supported the 
Islamic insurgencies in Kashmir, to take control of that part of Kashmir that is 
held by India. Irredentism also takes advantage of  a lack of central authority in 
an existing state which is home to large numbers of religions or ethnicities. 
Pakistan was in a position to intervene seriously in Kashmir in the late 1980s only 
because of the lack of effective governance in the region. Every country involved 
in providing aid to insurgencies has its own unique reasons and compulsions. It 
is usually a combination of reasons, which compels states to go ahead and take 
the risk of abetting insurgency.    
 Pakistan’s involvement in supporting insurgency in Kashmir can be traced 
back to a combination of historical reasons, domestic political and security 
compulsions, and a desire to be a leader in the Muslim world. 
C. ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION 
Pakistan became an independent nation on 14 August 1947. Even today, 
however, it continues to struggle with tensions arising from its attempts to identify 
itself both as a Muslim state and also as a modern nation-state.47 This two-nation 
theory is the basis of Pakistan’s foundation. Islam and Islamic values are 
embedded in some form in the two-nation theory. While Pakistan came into being 
as an Islamic country, Islam was never the basis for its foundation. However, 
post-independence there were rapid changes in Pakistan’s political and religious 
ideologies. The country slowly transited from secular ideology to one of Islamic 
theocracy. This began with the adoption of the “objectives resolution’ passed by 
the constituent assembly in March 1949, which was followed by the interim report 
of the Basic Principals Committee (BPC) in September 1950.48 While not being 
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anti-secular, these resolutions heralded Islamic ideology and religious rhetoric, 
which were to become the centerpiece of Pakistani politics in the next half-
century. A study of the role of Islam in Pakistani politics is important, as Pakistan 
has consistently used it as one of the tools for waging LIC. 
 After Pakistan’s defeat in the war of 1971, the leadership of the country fell 
to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, whose party had won the 1970 elections. Bhutto created a 
unique combination of Islam and socialism, which was designed to give 
legitimacy to his government. The Constitution of 1973 retained the name of the 
country as ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ and more importantly declared the state 
religion of Pakistan as “Islam.”49 In 1977, General Zia Ul Haq deposed Bhutto in 
a military coup on the grounds of saving the country from degeneration and 
instability. Islamist organizations that had never supported military regimes 
before were used by General Zia through a policy of Islamization and promoting 
Jamaat members and their allies to ministerial positions.50  
 General Zia, unlike Bhutto, was regarded as a pious Muslim, which helped 
him to gain the confidence of the Islamists. Zia’s interpretation of Islam was 
basically drawn from the Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami’s view of religion. The 
model for the Islamization project was supplied by Maulana Maududi’s theory of 
the state, and the Jamaat-i-Islami was the only political party that could freely 
function during General Zia’s regime. During his rule many aspects of the 
judiciary, education, and the media were subjected to far-reaching changes. 
Maududi did not allow any place for modern Western or liberal thought and relied 
entirely on the Quran and Sunnah.51 During this period Pakistan recorded its 
greatest increase in religious parties, sectarian organizations, and jihad-related 
organizations. The country also recorded its highest-ever growth rate in religious 
schools, as the number of Madrassahs increased from 700 in 1982 to 
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approximately 7,000 by 2002.52 Currently, it is estimated that there are between 
18,020 to 20,000 Madrassahs operating in Pakistan, teaching over 1.5 million 
children. Explaining the use of religion in Pakistan, Bennett argues that 
[a]highly destructive and long-lasting effect of the use of religion for 
political purposes, during Zia’s reign, was Pakistan’s involvement 
as a frontline state in the Afghan Jihad, and the creation of the 
mujahedin to drive out the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Islam 
was no longer an instrument of power for the local ruling classes, 
for it now became a tool in the global imperial contests over West 
and Central Asian oil and gas resources.53  
 A decade of civilian rule after the death of Zia did not fundamentally alter 
the role and importance of religious parties. In spite of Benazir Bhutto being 
secular and liberal, she went along with these parties to remain in power. Nawaz 
Sharif became prime minister with the help of the conservative Islami Jamhoori 
Ittehad in 1990. During his tenure, the Sharia Act of 1991 was passed. This was 
also the time when Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan and Pakistan became 
deeply involved in its affairs. “An examination of the post-partition history of 
Pakistan reveals that virtually every ruler, whether civil or military, religious or 
‘enlightened moderate,’ used religion as an instrument of the attainment, 
maintenance and perpetuation of power.”54 In the recent past, new radical 
Islamic parties have emerged, which are more violent and less agreeable to 
political solutions for their perceived problems. Pakistan represents an especially 
grave strategic threat to the international system because of its ambiguous 
approach to viewing and tackling terrorism, and for its unique interpretation of 
who constitutes a “freedom fighter.” 
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1. Radical Jihadi Groups of Pakistan 
 Pakistan has been home to a large number of radical jihadi groups, which 
are operating with bases both within Pakistan, and outside its territory. Many of 
these groups are often in a state of transition with events like splits, mergers, 
changes in names, or changes in affiliation being quite common. According to 
Tellis and as quoted by Bajoria, the terrorist groups in Pakistan can broadly be 
divided as: 
Sectarian - Groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-
Jafria, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan. 
Anti-Indian - Terrorist groups that operate with the alleged support of the 
Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 
such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the 
Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM).  
Afghan Taliban - The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari 
leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar believed to be now living in 
Quetta. 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates - The organization led by Osama bin Laden and 
other non-South Asian terrorists believed to be ensconced in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Rohan Gunaratna of the International Centre 
for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore says other foreign 
militant groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad 
group, the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement are also located in FATA. 
The Pakistani Taliban - Groups consisting of extremist outfits in the FATA, led 
by individuals such as Hakimullah Mehsud, of the Mehsud tribe in South 
Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur, and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of 
the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).55 
 
 A significant development in the last decade has been the development of 
a synergy amongst these terrorist groups.56 The Pakistani Taliban, which was 
committed to fighting the state, is now increasingly targeting U.S. and 
international troops fighting on the borders of Afghanistan.57 The complexity of 
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these organizations was described by General David H. Petraeus in a CFR 
interview as “They support each other, they coordinate with each other, 
sometimes they compete with each other and sometimes they even fight with 
each other, making it extremely difficult to distinguish between them.”58 Without a 
coherent target it is extremely difficult for Pakistan and the international 
community to isolate and target any particular group. The complexity of the 
problem has often numbed Pakistan, and to a great extent even the international 
community. 
2. Islam, Islamization, and its Radicalization in Pakistan 
 The beginnings of Islam in Pakistan were well founded, as the initial 
objective was to create a Muslim-majority state in South Asia as a homeland for 
India’s Muslims.59 “Islam was mobilized, to bridge the differences between “Sons 
of soil” and Muhajirs [Muslim migrants from India to Pakistan], and also between 
the provinces and the country’s leadership. Islam thus became the main 
legitimating force in Pakistan’s politics, underlying the viability of the federal 
state.”60 With the passage of time, Pakistan paid less and less attention to how it 
would transform itself into a Muslim state. In terms of this transformation, 
Pakistan can still be considered as a state in transition, as it continues to debate 
the role of Islam and Koran in the affairs of the state.  
 While its founding father, Jinnah, wanted the state to be secular, Pakistan 
today is slowly sliding towards becoming a pure Islamic state. As Pakistan 
evolved, Islam was mobilized whenever the state was challenged by either war 
or internal conflict. The military and civilian governments in power never allowed 
a free rein to the Islamists. Some of the secularization policies, in contravention 
to religious sentiments, while weakening the Islamic basis of the state, opened 
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up avenues for ethnic politics, which ultimately culminated in the secession of 
East Pakistan.61 The separation of Bangladesh further acted as a catalyst for 
Islamization in Pakistani politics. Nasr points out: 
Islamic identity, promoted by the state to contain separatist 
tendencies, now drew on the more stringent ideology of Islamism to 
define Pakistani identity. Pakistan moved from being a homeland 
for Muslims to being the embodiment-and also guarantor-of the 
Islamic ideal as defined by the ideology of Islamism.62 
 This process of slow Islamization saw the gradual transfer of some 
aspects of power from the democratically-elected governments to non–state 
actors, who were to dictate the pace of implementation of Sharia and such other 
rules and regulations dealing with religion. This abdication by the state of its right 
to govern and rule led to the beginning of lawlessness in the nation. 
D. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT BY PAKISTAN 
 An LIC can be fought in two generally accepted methods: The indirect, or 
standoff, method was practiced primarily by the superpowers, where they only 
provided resources or military hardware for the fight; or the direct method, where 
the host country provides both military hardware and the trained manpower to 
carry out an LIC. Pakistan finds it both convenient and effective to wage the 
direct method of LIC against India. 
 This method typically involves an LIC waged by the host nation against a 
near neighbor. It entails the identification of an insurgency-like situation that is 
amenable for exploitation, followed by a supply of resources and trained 
manpower. This also requires that the host nation invest its time and resources in 
the establishment of training camps, safe heavens, launch pads, retrieving 
stations, communication grids, and rehabilitation camps that will run during the 
entire cycle of LIC (see Figure 1). The most important and critical component of 
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this cycle is the recruitment, indoctrination, and training of manpower. In the 
context of Pakistan, manpower is provided by Islamic radicals who are churned 
out from the many radicalized madrassahs.  
Pakistan also facilitates the crossing of radicalized elements from Kashmir 
to Pakistan, with the aim of providing them training and further indoctrination to 
assume leadership roles back in insurgency-hit Kashmir. All these cross-border 
transactions require the active support of the Pakistani Army, as the Line of 
Control (LOC) is manned by them. From the above it is clear that in order to 
orchestrate an LIC the entire state machinery needs to become galvanized into 
action, albeit without public or judicial scrutiny. The complexity of waging LIC lies 
in the ability or inability of the state to control and fine-tune this process, without 
legal sanction. This ad hoc system has the potential to blow back against the 
host nation when there are disgruntled militants who either have their own 
agendas, or who wish to prosecute the LIC at a different place or in a different 
manner. The local law and order machinery is often confused about the status of 
these men who operate on both sides of the border with impunity. This 
amorphous status is often exploited by militants in order to pursue their own 
policies. Ganguly and Kapur note, “Pakistan’s use of militants has increasingly 
spun out of control, creating serious internal and external security challenges.”63   
 The explanation above attempts to establish a causal link between 
prevalence of an insurgency-like situation in the neighborhood, the exploitation of 
the situation by neighboring nation in order to wage LIC, and the availability of 
Islamic radical elements willing to fight a proxy war, which results in the creation 
of a powerful jihadi movement. Each of these individual elements has a symbiotic 
relationship with the other, and hence for the LIC to persist, each of the 
components must thrive. The unique aspect of this cycle is that the jihadist 
activities in the host nation are far greater than that in the target state, and 
accordingly their ability to impact the host nation are much greater. 
                                            




Figure 1.   Life Cycle of LIC and of a Terrorist Organization 
E. CONCLUSION 
Any support of insurgency initially starts as a conscious policy towards a 
desired end state. To begin with, it is easy to calibrate the level and scope of 
support that is intended for insurgencies across the border. The unpredictable 
part of the process begins once the effect of the insurgency is felt by the target 
country in particular and the international community in general. The reaction by 
the affected country and the response of international community together 
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produce unique conditions, which tend to bottle up the insurgents in the host 
country. It is under these circumstances that the host nation begins to feel the 
heat of the monster they helped create, as these jihadi groups turn their attention 
from outside the state’s borders to within them. In the context of Pakistan, these 
jihadi groups see Islam under attack within Pakistan itself. Earlier, more radical 
parties and their associated militant groups focused their attention on their own 
individual agendas, without sharing objectives. However, experts now observe 
that the distinction among all these groups has blurred and they see considerable 
continuity of thought and action across most of these organizations.64 Another 
new trend in Pakistan’s Islamist groups is the birth of splinter groups, which look 
down upon their parent organizations for their perceived moderate attitude; 
accordingly these groups develop a more radical outlook. This cycle ultimately 
leads to the establishment of more radical groups, which over a period of time 
morph into terrorist organizations. Both Pakistan and the international community 
have a stake in stopping the cycle, which breeds terrorism.  
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III. INITIAL CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN AND EVOLUTION 
OF LIC AS A STATE STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Relations between Pakistan and India on various issues have been 
strained since independence, with the most contentious of these being Kashmir. 
They have fought three full-scale wars, in 1947 and 1965 over Kashmir, and in 
1971 on both Western and Eastern fronts, which resulted in the formation of 
Bangladesh, and finally a localized war in 1999 in the Kargil Sector. While 
Pakistan was beaten back each time, it has always looked at options to stop this 
one-sided conflict and come out the victor. Under these circumstances, it is 
important to understand the changing dynamics in the Indo-Pak context, which 
forced Pakistan’s increased reliance on LIC as the most viable means of 
annexing Kashmir. It is also important to understand the unique domestic 
circumstances in India, and the international situation around Pakistan, which led 
Pakistan to greatly enhance the LIC in India in the 1990s. 
A number of experts have attempted to decipher and understand the 
seemingly unending conflict between India and Pakistan. Ganguly argues that 
“the immediate precipitants of wars in the region were all opportunistic events: in 
each case, one or both parties saw significant opportunities at critical historical 
junctures to damage the other’s fundamental claims either to the territory of 
Kashmir or to the larger project of state construction.”65 From the beginning, the 
Pakistani Army always saw itself as a superior force. Pakistani leadership grossly 
underestimated the capability of Indian political and military leadership. The bane 
of Pakistan was its poor understanding of relative military strength, the will of his 
opponents, and the support it could obtain from its allies. Alluding to this, 
Stephen Van Evera explains: 
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[c]hauvinist nationalism is the prime source of false optimism about 
the balance of will. Nationalist propaganda often inflates the 
bravery of one’s own people and denigrates the opponents 
toughness and character… Such propaganda is bound to foster 
illusions about one’s own fortitude and that of others. Nationalist 
mythology exaggerates the righteousness of the national cause, 
leading groups to be misled about the balance of legitimacy 
between their own, and their adversary’s claims. The balance of 
legitimacy, in turn, helps shape the balance of will.66 
 Pakistan, from the time of its independence, was never at ease with its 
larger, more powerful neighbor, India. “Pakistan has shown unmistakable 
propensity in not accepting India’s conventional military and nuclear 
superiority.”67 To offset this conventional military superiority, Pakistan has 
repeatedly looked at the use of irregulars as a conscious strategy in achieving 
politico-military objectives. Its ability to use this strategy effectively has been 
influenced by domestic, regional, and international events. A study of these 
events is essential to understand Pakistan's strategy of using LIC as a conscious 
policy to achieve its desired goals. 
B. PARTITION OF BRITISH INDIA 
Pakistan, like all newborn nations, had its share of birth pangs, and the 
trauma of partition was further aggravated by the large-scale influx of Muslims 
from across India with a corresponding exodus of a productive Hindu population 
out of its territory. In the partition line drawn by the British, Pakistan “inherited 23 
percent of the landmass of undivided India and 18 percent of the population.”68 
Pakistan began its journey with certain obvious shortcomings, such as a lack of 
legitimacy, as it was India that was the true inheritor of the British Raj, and 
Pakistan was a state that was carved out of it. Pakistan had to begin its existence 
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by applying for various international memberships, a few of which were granted 
automatically to India. Pakistan’s strategic deficit was also in terms of its 
industrial base, as “colonial industrial development had clustered around 
Bombay, Ahmadabad, Calcutta and the West Bengal/Bihar coal belt, leaving 
Pakistan with just 10 percent of the industrial base.”69 Partition also separated 
Pakistani raw material from its traditional markets and factories in India.   
Strategically, Pakistan faced many challenges, such as the creation of 
East Pakistan some 1,000 miles away from West Pakistan. It also had to contend 
with a lawless tribal population on the Afghan border, with the government in 
Kabul not exactly recognizing the border with Pakistan. Politically, Pakistan’s 
Muslim League was not as well organized as the Indian National Congress. As 
Ayesha Jalal points out, “the League’s weakness meant that Pakistani politicians 
had to concede much greater autonomy to the administrative bureaucracy, to 
consolidate state authority than did their Indian counterparts.”70 Pakistan also 
bore the additional burden of establishing a new provincial government at Dhaka 
in East Pakistan.  
Pakistan’s experiments with democracy have been marked by a “multi-
layered trajectory of contrasts and contradictions, be [they] in the social, political 
and/or economic domains since the very inception of the country.”71 Pakistan, 
from the beginning, was concerned about issues like Kashmir, the division of 
assets between the two states, and also the threat of a seemingly ominous 
neighbor, India. There was a sense of inferiority and insecurity in the psyche of 
the Pakistani leadership that arose immediately after independence. This feeling 
was further fuelled by delays in the transfer of assets from India to Pakistan.  
 The events in Kashmir immediately after independence raised doubts and 
apprehensions in the minds of both India and Pakistan. For the next half-century, 
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Kashmir was to become the bone of contention, and the raison d'être for conflict 
in the region. Despite having lasted for more than 60 years, the issue of Kashmir 
still remains fresh in the minds of both Pakistan and India, with no viable solution. 
C. EVENTS INSTRUMENTAL IN EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGY OF LIC 
1. The Kashmir War of 1947–48 
  This part of the chapter will briefly examine some of the important events 
that led up to the Kashmir War in 1947. As part of the British plan for partition of 
India, it was decided to allow the rulers of the 565 princely states that had 
previously recognized the Paramountcy of the British crown to determine the 
future of their territories by fiat. The princely states were given a choice to either 
join India or Pakistan, or to opt for independence. The princes were advised by 
British Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, who was responsible for overseeing the 
partition process, to consider territorial contiguity and the religious affiliations of 
their subjects.72 The situation in Kashmir was unique, as a Hindu Maharaja ruled 
a predominantly Muslim state, and was further complicated by the fact that 
Kashmir shared borders with both India and Pakistan. Hari Singh, the Maharaja 
of Kashmir, wanted independence, much against the advice of Mountbatten who 
had counseled that it would be in their own interest to accede to one of the two 
new states. From the beginning, Mohamed Ali Jinnah had campaigned in 
Kashmir for its accession to Pakistan. It is also believed that the Muslim 
intelligentsia and clergy in the Kashmir Valley supported the Muslim League.73 
On the other hand, the Hindus of Jammu and the Buddhists of Ladakh were not 
pleased with the idea of being part of a Muslim state. In addition, the vast 
majority of the Kashmiri Muslims, who were mostly poor peasants, saw a brighter 
economic future in India.74     
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Immediately after the partition, the Maharaja of Kashmir was under 
intense pressure from both India and Pakistan to join their fold. The Maharaja 
refused to accede to either side, but he did sign a “standstill agreement” with 
Pakistan that enabled the two states to carry on with certain basic commercial 
transactions. “Meanwhile, during the first week of October 1947 tribal rebellion 
broke out in Poonch district of Kashmir. Sections of the Pakistani army quickly 
moved to aid the rebels with arms, transport and men.”75 The weak forces of the 
Maharaja were unable to stop the onslaught of the tribals, who were assisted by 
the regular army. Within two weeks this group was on the outskirts of Srinagar, 
the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The Maharaja, who was by now in a state of 
shock, asked for Indian military help to stop the tribals from advancing further.  
The Indian prime minister, Nehru, agreed to provide assistance only if two 
preconditions were met: the Maharaja must agree to join India and this decision 
must have the approval of Sheikh Abdullah. On October 26, once the Maharaja 
had signed the instrument of accession and Abdullah gave his approval, Nehru 
instructed Indian troops to be airlifted into Kashmir.76 Thus began the Kashmir 
War, which ultimately led to the division of Kashmir into two parts. 
The Indian Army was able to stop the marauding tribals and push them 
back to a considerable distance. By December 1947, the Indian Army was facing 
logistical difficulties and the pace of operations had reduced. By this point, the 
Pakistani Army was fully involved in the battle for Kashmir and was also 
simultaneously threatening to cut off the link between Amritsar and Jammu by 
concentrating a large force in the area. India at this stage was conscious that it 
could not make further headway, unless Pakistan stopped supporting the tribals. 
The advance of the tribesmen, duly supported by the Pakistani Army, into 
Kashmir was to trigger a series of events, which would fundamentally alter the 
security situation in the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan officially entered the battle 
for Kashmir in May 1948, on the plea that Pakistan could not be a viable state if 
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India controlled Kashmir in its entirety.77 The use of rebels or infiltrators by 
Pakistan in this war was more out of necessity than by any grand design or 
strategy. The Pakistani Army at this stage was still being led by British officers 
and the junior Pakistani officers could ill afford to take the British into confidence 
before launching an attack on Kashmir.   
While Pakistan was not able to capture the prized “Valley,” it was able to 
gain control over a sizeable area of Kashmir. It was in this encounter that 
Pakistan learned the usefulness of LIC, as they found it cheaper and the 
deniability factor was built into the methodology of operations. Pakistan 
accordingly never accepted its involvement in the conflict from October 1947 to 
May 1948, and called the entire action an indigenous movement. The Pakistani 
government best understood the power and convenience of deniability, and it 
was to become the cornerstone of Pakistani policy towards India, Afghanistan, 
and the United States and, later on, the rest of the world. 
2. The Indo Pakistani war of 1965 
Pakistan launched a two-stage military operation into Kashmir in August 
1965. The first stage involved the infiltration of a large number of insurgents 
across the cease-fire line with the aim of capturing the radio station and the 
Srinagar airport. The second stage of military invasion of Kashmir was conceived 
as a way of building on the gains accomplished in the first stage. The Pakistani 
military was of the opinion that the insurgents would create zones of liberated 
areas, which would allow the regular forces to walk through Kashmir. In response 
to this action, the Indian Army expanded the scope of war by attacking across the 
international border in the area of Lahore. The Pakistani Army immediately took 
defensive action to protect the city by destroying a large number of bridges on 
the canal that surrounded it. The Indian strategy of expanding the war beyond 
Kashmir was not in Pakistan’s calculus and Pakistan was accordingly not as well 
prepared for it. In this war, non-state the actors were not able to make major 
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contributions to the primary objective, and Pakistan underestimated the resolve 
of India, to protect its claim over Kashmir, even if it meant expanding the scope 
of operations to sectors beyond Jammu and Kashmir.  
Pakistan learned two important lessons from this war. First, it could not 
impose its will militarily on India to achieve the surrender of Kashmir. Second, the 
ability of rebels/infiltrators to cause an uprising within the state of Kashmir was 
contingent on existence of significant discord and animosity against the local 
government. In the absence of such animosity, the rebels had limited 
sustainability and hence could not achieve their desired end. Even in this war, 
Pakistan could not unleash the full potential of an LIC, as the situation was not 
ripe for exploitation. Pakistan attributed the stalemate to the inadequate 
indoctrination of the Kashmiri population, which largely contributed to the lack of 
popular support for the tribal invasion. Accordingly, Pakistan continued to hedge 
on the usefulness of irregulars in achieving its strategic aims, and in addition, 
began looking at options for the creation of the “right environment” in Kashmir to 
facilitate an LIC. 
3. The Bangladesh War of 1971 
The nature and the origins of the 1971 war were very different from the 
two earlier military engagements between India and Pakistan. While Pakistan 
initiated the first two wars, it was India that took the initiative in 1971. The basic 
causes of this conflict lay in the complexities of Pakistani domestic politics. 
Analyzing the situation in South Asia, Ganguly notes: 
In the aftermath of Pakistan’s first democratic elections in October 
1970, a long-standing demand for regional autonomy gathered 
considerable force in East Pakistan. Soon thereafter negotiations 
over power-sharing reached a deadlock. Unable to break this 
deadlock, the military regime of General Yahya Khan resorted to 
the extensive use of deadly force against the East Pakistani 
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population [which was primarily ethnically Bengali], thereby 
precipitating a full-scale civil war by March-April 1971.78 
The West Pakistani forces launched “Operation Searchlight” in March 
1971, which was basically focused on the Bengali population of Dhaka and its 
neighborhood. “The main aim of this operation was to decimate sources of 
political opposition to the military regime in West Pakistan. The brutality and the 
scale of this military operation against the civilian population were unparalleled in 
the history of South Asia.”79 The immediate impact of the Civil War was the influx 
of over 10 million refugees into India. Indian policymakers were of the opinion 
that it was cheaper to wage war with Pakistan than to manage and maintain the 
refugee population.  
India initially described its intervention in East Pakistan as one of 
humanitarian aid. It is true that Indian intervention did end the loss of lives in the 
military crackdown of East Pakistan, but it must also be noted that India exploited 
a window of opportunity provided by Pakistan. India was aware that a divided 
Pakistan would be less of a threat in the future, as it would not be faced with a 
two-front war. In addition, the creation of Bangladesh was to fundamentally 
question the two-nation theory based on Islam, a concept so avidly propagated 
by Pakistan during partition. While the bond of Islam existed between East and 
West Pakistan, there were tremendous inequalities at the social, economic, and 
political levels. The people of East Pakistan had never been reconciled to the 
imposition of Urdu as the national language over a predominantly Bengali-
speaking population, and the proud Bengalis considered it an affront to their 
linguistic and intellectual heritage. The emergence of Bangladesh as an 
independent nation was always written on the wall, and the Indian action was 
merely a catalyst that hastened the process. Ganguly observes: 
[t]he euphoria of India’s decisive victory over Pakistan lasted for a 
considerable span of time. Between 1972 and 1983, various 
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governments in New Delhi showed skill, tact, and intelligence in 
dealing with the internal dimension of the Kashmir problem. From 
1984 onwards, however, they returned to the extraordinary 
clumsiness, thoughtlessness, and downright deceit that had 
characterized domestic policy towards Kashmir in the 1950s and 
1960s. These highly uneven policies of accommodation and 
manipulation ultimately culminated in an ethno-religious insurgency 
in December 1989 that once again gave Pakistan a chance to pry 
Kashmir out of the Indian Union.80 
The War of 1971 effectively closed Pakistan’s military options for capturing 
Kashmir. Pakistan then began a serious search for alternate options to achieve 
its strategic goal of annexing Kashmir. The trauma and intensity of defeat of 
1971, as well as the domestic political situation, did not give Pakistan a window 
of opportunity to look seriously at India for the next two decades. It also lay to 
rest the misplaced myth of Pakistani military superiority.  
4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: 1979 
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had significant effects on both 
Pakistan and India. Pakistan technically faced threats on both its borders. On 
one side was the Soviet-installed regime of Babrak Karmal and on the other side 
was India, which was uncomfortable with the new military regime of General 
Zia.81 The general, through some tactical handling on the part of the United 
States, was able to garner substantial economic and military aid in exchange for 
lending support to the U.S. in Afghanistan. The next decade saw significant 
domestic and international activity in the region, which had long-term implications 
for both South Asia and the international community. It was during this period 
that the United States increasingly relied on Pakistan to meet its strategic needs 
in Afghanistan against the Soviets, and correspondingly India bet on the Soviets 
to checkmate a Pakistan-U.S. partnership. The United States committed close to 
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U.S. $5 billion between 1980 and 1992 in aid to the mujahedin; all of this funding 
was routed through Pakistan’s ISI.82 The ISI’s level of involvement can be 
gauged through Gregory’s observation: 
[t]he crucial development for the ISI was the decision by the United 
States, through the CIA, to use Pakistan’s ISI as the instrument of 
support for the Afghan rebels. The ISI already had deep inroads 
into Afghanistan and laid down strict conditions, which the CIA 
accepted, that the ISI would control almost all aspects of how the 
guerrilla war was fought and supported. The ISI insisted that it 
would retain control over contracts with Afghan rebels, that no 
Americans [CIA included] would cross the Afghan border from 
Pakistan, that movements of weapons within Pakistan and their 
disbursement to the Afghani groups would be handled exclusively 
by the ISI, and that all training of Afghan rebels would be handled 
by the ISI.83 
America’s willingness to agree to the terms laid down by the Pakistani ISI 
greatly assisted Pakistan in siphoning off a large quantum of aid and weapons for 
deployment in its area of interest both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. This de-
facto set the stage for successful orchestration of LIC in Kashmir. By the late 
1980s, Pakistan was out of the shadows of the 1971 war, had a modicum of 
international support, was well-endowed with military hardware, and had a pool 
of trained mujahedeen; the only aspect missing for launch of an LIC in Kashmir 
was a favorable environment, which the Indians were soon to offer. 
5. The Punjab Militancy 
 The Khalistani separatist insurgency in the Punjab was driven both by 
certain historical facts and political developments in the region in the early 1980s. 
Pakistan, under General Zia, with its newfound support from the United States 
was fully poised to exploit the situation in the Punjab. “General Zia sought to 
raise the cost of insurgency for the Indian state by covertly aiding the 
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insurgents.”84 By the late 1980s, large parts of the Punjab were affected by 
terrorist activity, taking a substantial toll on Punjabi police forces in the beginning, 
as well as, to a certain degree, the Indian military. It was against this backdrop 
that India launched a 1987 military exercise code-named “Brasstacks.” While this 
exercise was ostensibly to test the newly-introduced mechanized units of the 
Indian Army, it was also an exercise in coercive diplomacy, designed to stop 
Pakistan from interfering in the Punjab. Some of these events of 1980 led 
Pakistan to believe that it could launch LIC against India, as it had sufficient 
conventional military power to deter India, against a de facto nuclear backdrop. 
This realization by Pakistan, and the beginnings of the domestic problem in 
Kashmir, were to provide both a new dimension and a clear incentive for the 
instigation of an LIC in India. 
6. The Jammu and Kashmir Militancy  
 A combination of poor political direction from the center and inept handling 
of the domestic situation by the state government of Kashmir led to the beginning 
of a new wave of militancy in the Kashmir Valley. Until the early 1990s, “[m]ost 
commentators agreed that the primary cause of the Kashmir insurgency could be 
found in India’s domestic affairs. Pakistani support for the militants was typically 
viewed as an important, but secondary factor in the Kashmiri question.”85 The 
events of January 1990, when Srinagar police fired into a demonstration, killing 
32 people, “transformed the Kashmiri insurgency, from a mainly Indian affair, into 
renewed Indo-Pakistani conflict”.86 According to U.S. Ambassador Robert B. 
Oakley: 
Pakistan, willy-nilly, began to play a much more active role. 
Unofficially, groups such as Jamaat-I Islami [an Islamic political 
party] as well as ISI and the Pakistani Army began to take a more 
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active role in support to the Kashmiri protests. Training camps of 
various kinds multiplied…. There was much more activity. There 
were more people and more material going across the border from 
Pakistan into Kashmir.87 
Benazir Bhutto further raised the stakes in Kashmir when she announced 
the creation of a $4 million fund to support the “freedom fighters” across the Line 
of Actual Control.88 The situation in Kashmir clearly gave Pakistan a window of 
opportunity and it willingly transferred jihadis from the Afghanistan front to the 
Kashmir Valley. Simultaneously, Pakistan began to orchestrate the rise of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan with the aim of installing a pro-Pakistani, Pashtun-led 
Islamist government. As Gregory notes: 
[f]rom the late 1980s, the ISI launched a more assertive strategy to 
destabilize Jammu and Kashmir. The pertinent elements of this 
plan were fourfold: [a] to divert arms and ammunition from the 
Afghan conflict-including many of those siphoned off during the 
Afghan War by the ISI-and use the weapons to empower favored 
J&K separatist groups; [b] to expand the number of Madaris and 
training camps inside Pakistan administered Kashmir to boost the 
number of trained and indoctrinated fighters who could be infiltrated 
into Indian controlled territory; [c] to transit Afghan and international 
Muslim fighters from Afghan conflict to the new pan-Islamist “holy 
war” in Jammu and Kashmir, and [d] to create new militant 
organizations that could become the vehicles for ISI control of the 
separatist insurgency.89 
The effect of Pakistan’s policies, along with the repressive tactics of 
India’s counterinsurgency led to a spiral of violence, which cost more than 50,000 
lives.90 The two seemingly-unrelated events, the end of the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, and internal disturbances in the state of Jammu Kashmir, provided 
Pakistan with a unique opportunity. Pakistan saw the convergence of its aims 
and opportunities in Kashmir and it did not want to miss out. The exploitation of 
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this opportunity clearly meant a quantum jump in its overt and covert involvement 
in Jammu and Kashmir. “It was also an excellent opportunity to impose 
significant materials and other costs in India at little cost to themselves.”91 Thus, 
it would not be incorrect to say that 1990 was the beginning of a new chapter of 
Pakistan’s intense involvement in LIC in both Kashmir and Afghanistan. 
7. The Period from 1990 to 2009 
 The 1990s saw a substantial increase in Pakistan’s involvement, both in 
Afghanistan and, Jammu and Kashmir. After the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan was heavily involved in the establishment of a pro-Taliban 
government in Kabul. Both the Pakistani Army and the ISI had recognized that a 
friendly government in Kabul was essential in making Pakistan’s Western flank 
secure, so that it could concentrate its energy in the East near the states of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Its presence in Afghanistan was also considered essential 
to providing strategic depth in the case of an Indian offensive.92 To this end, 
Pakistan provided the Taliban with all necessary help in terms of weapons, 
logistics, finance, and political support.  
The democratically-elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz 
Sharif had subordinated themselves to the military on most foreign policy issues, 
with the most important being the situation along both its borders. On the Indian 
front, the situation in Kashmir continued to deteriorate throughout the 1990s, 
partly because of Pakistan’s active support for the militants, and also due to poor 
handling of the state by the Indian government.93 The situation slowly began to 
change in the second half of the 1990s, when the Pakistan-aided insurgency 
slowly began to wane, as the Indian Army began to take control of the situation 
and India was able to hold three successful elections in Kashmir. It was around 
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this time that Pakistan began its misadventure in Kargil by sending its Northern 
light infantry, disguised as mujahedin, to occupy key terrain features overlooking 
the strategically-important road connecting Srinagar and Leh. The aim of this 
operation was to rekindle the Kashmir conflict and refocus the attention of the 
international community on the Kashmiri situation.94 Pakistan was also 
emboldened by its newfound status as a nuclear weapons state. With this 
operation, Pakistan stretched the envelope of LIC to a level that was 
unacceptable to India. Accordingly, India responded conventionally with the use 
of both its ground and air assets to dislodge the infiltrators.  
In this entire operation, Pakistan received no international support, 
although India’s actions were looked at more sympathetically. The ferocious 
attacks of the Indian Army, the tough stance taken by the United States, along 
with the uncompromising attitude of the Indian political leadership, finally 
facilitated in the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. With this, Pakistan finally became 
conscious of its own capabilities and limitations. While the 1971 operations had 
shown its limitations on the conventional front, the conflict of 1999 showed the 
extent to which the concept of LIC could be stretched. Thus, the only option left 
for Pakistan was to continue with calibrated low levels of LIC, which would not 
raise the ante for India and the international community, and at the same time 
sufficiently bleed India.  
The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the rapid 
mobilization by India, followed by Pakistan, and the subsequent diffusion of 
tension highlighted the relevance of nuclear deterrence.95 Kux comments: 
[w]ith the temperature between Islamabad and New Delhi nearing a 
boil, Musharraf announced a major policy shift on January 12, 
2002. By stating that his country would no longer be a base for 
foreign terrorism, the Pakistani leader implicitly pledged to end ISI 
support for attacks across the Line of Control. Musharraf also hit 
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hard at domestic Islamic fundamentalists, calling for an end to the 
extremism and violence that have wracked Pakistan in recent 
years. Although privately pleased with the speech, the Indian 
government’s official reaction emphasized that Musharraf’s words 
needed to be translated into deeds before India would lower its 
guard.96 
The attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent the United States GWOT had far-
reaching consequences for the security situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which 
had been an active supporter of the Taliban in Afghanistan, had to change its 
policies and had to realign its policies to be in tune with U.S. aims and 
aspirations. “Pakistan became a ‘valued ally’ in the U.S. fight against terrorism.”97 
Pakistan provided a much-needed logistic base for the United States operations 
in Afghanistan aimed at the capture of Osama bin Laden. While General 
Musharraf was forthcoming with his support for the U.S., many groups and 
individuals within Pakistan did not support his decision. The most vociferous 
opposition was from Islamic radical parties such as Jamaat-I-Islami, Jamaat-ul-
Ulema-e-Islam and, internally, from elements of the ISI which were sympathetic 
to the Taliban. Pakistan began fighting the Taliban, albeit reluctantly, because 
they needed U.S. support and economic aid. This change in stand created 
immense unease and distrust between the government and the Muslim clergy 
(who controlled the insurgent and terrorist groups).  
D. Conclusion 
The acrimonious relationship between Pakistan and India can be traced 
back to the time of independence, but it is the period after 1971 that stands out in 
regards to Pakistan’s strategy of using LIC as a state strategy against India. The 
use of irregulars to offset India’s conventional military superiority became a 
necessity in the aftermath of the 1971 debacle in East Pakistan. The process 
started by General Zia with India as the target, soon found a testing ground in 
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Afghanistan, when the United States expressed its desire to force the Soviets 
out, using Pakistan as the launch pad and the mujahedin as the preferred tool of 
war. Pakistan used this unique opportunity to establish a well-oiled mechanism to 
train and indoctrinate a large pool of fighters, who were ready to take battle to 
either side of its borders. This period was also used by the Pakistani Army and 
the ISI, to siphon off large amounts of aid and military hardware. India’s poor 
handling of the internal situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 
1980s gave Pakistan an opportunity to transfer its attention to fomenting trouble 
in the Kashmir region of India. It was thus that the 1990s saw Pakistan’s 
complete involvement in aiding and abetting the insurgency, with the aim of 
weakening India, tying down the Indian Armed Forces, and ultimately aiming 
wrest control of Kashmir from India. 
The counterinsurgency operations launched by India began to take effect 
in the late 1990s, along with a simultaneous deterioration in the Internal situation 
in Pakistan. Pakistan’s 1999 adventure in Kargil was an expression of its 
frustration with the course of events in its neighborhood. The next major event 
that was to alter Pakistan’s security situation was the 9/11 attack in the United 
States and Pakistan’s decision to support the U.S. in the GWOT. This meant a 
clear turnaround in Pakistan’s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
substantial pressure to reduce its operations in Kashmir. This “bottling in” effect 
from both sides, was a defining moment for Pakistan as it led to the beginning of 
Jihad within Pakistan, and to a spiraling state of instability. While Pakistan’s 
policies post-2000 did yield considerable U.S. economic and military aid, it slowly 
began to pay a heavy price in terms of a deteriorating domestic security situation.  
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IV. EFFECT OF LIC ON PAKISTAN’S WELL-BEING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Pakistan saw fomenting trouble in Jammu and Kashmir and other North 
Eastern states of India as a “low-cost, high-gain option.” In effect, sponsoring 
insurgency in India was seen as a means of balancing the asymmetries (through 
the philosophy of a war by thousand cuts) between the two countries.98 Pakistan 
achieved a certain amount of success in stymieing India’s growth, keeping the 
Kashmir issue alive, and tying down the Indian Army in the Kashmir valley. A 
recent Rand Corporation report argued, “the use of militant groups, including the 
Taliban, has remained an important instrument for Pakistan’s security forces in 
its regional strategy.”99 On the issue of LIC, Schofield comments:  
[a]fter Pakistan’s own military attempts in 1947-1949 and in 1965 
had failed, the idea of conducting a proxy war on indigenous 
dissent was a low-cost, potentially high-yielding alternative. Even 
though there was no question of Pakistan ideologically supporting a 
movement that aspired to gain independence, it was felt that any 
group that was working to destabilize India’s control of the state 
would be beneficial to Pakistan. If nothing else were achieved, it 
would be revenge in return for the assistance India had given to 
East Pakistan in 1971 leading to the cessation and the creation of 
independent Bangladesh.100 
This thesis’s argument is that the policy of LIC may offer short-term 
benefits, but can prove disastrous in the long-term. Short-term benefits can be 
easily perceived and are often apparent and politically expedient, but long-term 
impacts are generally difficult to fathom and are not obvious to policy makers or 
the general public. The impact of LIC on the host nation can often be a very slow 
process, and can be compared to a low-level virus attack with a long gestation 
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period. By the time its effects appear, it can be difficult to trace its causal origins, 
and it can be even more difficult to comprehend the “cause-effect” relationship. 
Having invested in a seemingly winning strategy, it can be near-suicidal for 
politicians and Pakistan’s armed forces to change course. Thus, this strategy of 
abetting LIC has the potential to toss a nation in an unrecoverable tailspin. LIC, 
when used as a state strategy, is now viewed with great suspicion by the 
international community in the new globalized, post-9/11 world. To make an 
objective assessment of the effects of LIC on Pakistan, it is also important to 
examine LIC’s impact on India, the target of Pakistan’s LIC initiatives. 
B. EFFECT OF LIC ON INDIA 
1. Economic Costs 
 In response to the Pakistan-aided insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and 
a few other states, India needed to raise the level of troop strength that was 
already fighting a low-level insurgency in Kashmir. Its basic counterterrorism 
strategy was to bring the level of insurgency to a level where the state 
administration could get back on its feet and begin functioning. Over the last two 
decades, Pakistan made every possible effort to derail this process through 
funding terrorists, controlling infiltration, creating propaganda, and finally by 
increasing the level of violence unleashed by foreign militants. This led India to 
deploy a large contingent of its army and the creation of a special 
counterinsurgency force called the “Rastriya Rifles” which together cost India 
approximately $3 billion annually in 1999.101 This also led to the construction of 
the 2,019 km long border fence costing approximately $300 million along the 
entire length of Indo-Pakistan border.102  These costs for a growing economy like 
India’s were substantial, as these resources could have been better used for 
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essential sectors like health, education, or infrastructure development. The 
occasional Pakistan-supported terrorist actions in India are also a cause for 
concern, as it impacts investor confidence and in turn has direct influence on 
(Foreign Direct Investment) FDI. As a result, there is a general acceptance that 
state-sponsored terrorism, as is being attempted by Pakistan across national 
boundaries in India, is paying some dividends to Pakistan.103  
2. Human Costs  
 The impact of LIC in the state of Jammu and Kashmir has been felt both 
by civilians and security forces operating in the area. In addition to human 
casualties, the state has generated a large number of refugees who have 
migrated to other parts of India, and internally it has led to economic stagnation. 
The main economic activity in the state, i.e., tourism, has been adversely 
affected by terrorism. “Narcotrafficking, indulged in by the terrorists to finance the 
operations, has also been an unwelcome consequence.”104 
 Low-intensity conflict operations are typically characterized by limited use 
of force and accordingly a soldier who is trained in the use of lethal force finds 
himself in an alien environment. In the Indian context, the soldier does not 
encounter an enemy but his own fellow citizen. This kind of ambiguous situation 
increases the stress level of soldiers participating in an LIC. In addition, the 
“ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success, [and] high casualty rates tend to erode 
morale among security forces. Several operational factors such as fatigue, 
unpredictability of threat, extended tenure of stay, absence of recreational 
avenues, domestic worries, and problems related to leave increase the level of 
frustration.”105 The unique aspects of an LIC are that operations are conducted 
with no secure firm bases, and along insecure lines of communications, over 
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protracted periods of time. This kind of deployment has both short-term and long-
term consequences for both the individual soldier and his extended family. While 
this issue of psychological impact is being discussed in the Indian context, the 
same effects are also applicable to Pakistani forces fighting insurgencies within 
their country. While India entered into counterinsurgency operations in a phased 
manner, Pakistan has been pushed into this battle in a rather unexpected 
manner. Accordingly, the challenges being faced by Pakistan are far more 
difficult and uncertain. The details of insurgency-related deaths of terrorists, the 
security forces, and the civilians in Jammu and Kashmir are detailed in Figure 
2.106 The graph clearly highlights the escalation of violence in India in the post-
1990s. 
 
Figure 2.   Insurgency Related Killings: 1988–2000 
3. Internationalization of Kashmir Issue  
 One of the main achievements of a Pakistan-aided LIC in Kashmir is that it 
has been able to keep the issue of Kashmir alive in international forums. Both the 
insurgent/terrorist activities aided by Pakistan and India’s counterinsurgency 
activities routinely make headlines in international media. In addition, India has 
not been able to incorporate Kashmir as a "normal" state into the Indian union.107 
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While there was certain amount of sympathy and understanding for Pakistan’s 
cause in Kashmir, this has been lost or reduced in the last two decades due to 
Pakistan’s overindulgence in its strategy of LIC.108 The world at large is averse to 
the idea of redrawing international borders, and any coercive methodology or 
policy towards achievement of this end is not looked at sympathetically. 
C. EFFECT OF LIC ON PAKISTAN 
Since independence, Pakistan has gone through regular cycles of 
democratic and military rule. These regime changes were mostly driven by 
internal political dynamics, and the military often took control of the state with the 
excuse that politicians were no longer in control of the situation. Within a few 
years, power would be transferred back to a civilian government, on the grounds 
of inefficiency and mismanagement by the military, albeit with a certain amount of 
international help. Between independence and 1980, non-state actors had limited 
or no role to play within Pakistani politics, as they were only used as a vanguard 
for a conventional conflict, as in 1947 and 1965. The infusion of non-state actors 
in the political center stage began with Pakistani involvement in providing aid to 
mujahedin in Afghanistan.  
By the end of the decade, Pakistan was home to a large pool of well-
trained, battle-hardened, and religiously-indoctrinated fighters with no clear aim 
or purpose. This was also the time when trouble was brewing in the Indian area 
of Kashmir, and Pakistan clearly saw an opportunity to use this trained group. 
The initial success of these groups in the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
emboldened Pakistan to increase its recruitment base across the state. This 
began a new chapter in Pakistan’s direct involvement in state sponsorship of 
insurgency with the ISI acting as the main coordinating agency. This was also the 
time when Pakistan became heavily involved in supporting the Afghan Taliban to 
take control of Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan was effectively involved in aiding and 
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abetting LIC on both its borders. The Pakistan of the 1990s was a state deeply 
embroiled in ethnic tension, sectarian violence, and a clear lack of cohesive 
central rule. Cohen, explaining the situation in Pakistan, notes: 
Pakistan’s Islamic extremists are a mixed lot. Some are criminals 
wrapped in the mantle of divine justice; some have modest 
Pakistani related objectives; and others are seized with sectarian 
hatred. The radical groups’ theological origins inherently divide 
them, and although most are Deobandis, some are not, including 
the extremely violent Shia groups. Nevertheless, all these groups 
tend to splinter in ways reminiscent of the extreme right and left in 
other parts of the world, and a burning sense of injustice may 
motivate a few foreign born radicals to join them. These groups 
expend their energy on ordinary Pakistani citizens or on one 
another; or they direct their efforts-usually with government 
assistance-towards India and, until recently, Afghanistan. Some 
radical Islamic groups are linked to more mainstream political 
movements or serve as the fighting or terrorist arm of such 
movements.109 
The scale of terrorist violence within Pakistan can be estimated by looking 
at fatalities over the last few decades. The high rate of acceleration of violence is 
an indicator of Pakistan’s looming loss of control. This period also saw a dramatic 
increase in suicide attacks. In 2002, there were 22 suicide attacks; this number 
rose to 56 in 2007, and to 59 in 2008.110 Figures 3 and 4111 show terrorism-
related incidents and the casualty pattern in Pakistan for the period from 1970 to 
2010. The graphs clearly indicate high rates of terrorist incidents after 1990, 
when compared to the previous two decades. There is a fairly definitive 
correlation between Pakistan’s involvements in LIC across its borders during this 
period, with a corresponding increase in instability within the state. 
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Figure 3.   Terrorism Incidents in Pakistan 
 
 
Figure 4.   Killed and Wounded in Terrorism 
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D. EFFECT ON STABILITY 
1.  Radicalization and Its Effect on Stability 
  Pakistan’s experiments with Islamic extremism took root under Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto in the 1970s, as he systematically promoted Islamization as a cover for 
his own autocratic tendencies; this continued until he was deposed by General 
Zia in 1977.112 General Zia, himself a devout Muslim, had views which were in 
alignment with Jammat-e-Islami; he was also the first army chief to openly praise 
and support Islamic groups. Zia was also instrumental in providing training and 
economic support to the most radical and yet militarily effective Islamic groups in 
the war to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. Most of these radical groups had 
ties with counterparts in Pakistani cities such as Peshawar, and other parts of the 
North Western Frontier Province (NWFP).113 Over a period of time a symbiotic 
relationship was established between militants operating in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir, and with extremist organizations within Pakistan. Even today, the  
Pakistani military provides overt and strategic support to the country’s Islamic 
fundamentalists, but this approach appears to be backfiring as these very 
radicals are mounting a challenge to central power. They routinely disrupt 
Parliamentary work along with some secular opposition parties. With the 
breakdown of law and order, the state has become less and less relevant in the 
lives of ordinary people.114 As the state becomes less relevant, one sees a 
corresponding rise in the importance of non-state entities such as radical Islamic 
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the state invariably intervenes and tries to take control of the situation, without 
making any fundamental changes in governance. Thus, an increase in the role of 
the state, with a corresponding decline in governance, is a sure recipe for 
another cycle of violence.115   
 The Pakistani government has shown a marked reluctance to identify and 
take action against radical Islamic organizations. In January 2002, the 
government banned JeM and LeT under U.S. pressure, but these organizations 
reappeared with new names after lying dormant for a while. The Sharif 
government sought the help of LeT in containing the Deobandi groups, while the 
Musharraf government looked the other way as radical groups tormented India in 
Kashmir. Cohen argues, “[I]t will not be radical Islamic groups that threaten the 
basic stability of Pakistan, but the state organs that encourage them.”116 From 
the above discussion it is clear that breeding terrorism at home for export alone 
is a fallacy, as homegrown terrorists often find a domestic market.  
2. Pakistan Military Operations in NWFP and its Impact 
  In the last decade, the Pakistani Army has been challenged within its own 
country by the Taliban/Al Qaeda-led insurgency in the NWFP and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While the Pakistani Army and the ISI had 
perfected the art of aiding and abetting terrorism in Afghanistan and in Jammu 
and Kashmir, they had little or no experience in the nuances of 
counterinsurgency techniques. This was clearly highlighted in its initial failure to 
regain control of the Swat Valley.117 Pakistan had to deploy its regular army 
along with Special Forces, as its initial deployment of paramilitary forces such as 
the Frontier Corps were unable to control the situation in Waziristan.  
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The Pakistani Army launched major operations to regain “liberated areas” 
with the use of massive firepower, both from the ground and the air. “This heavy-
handed firepower based approach without simultaneous infantry operations failed 
to dislodge the militants but caused large-scale collateral damage and served to 
alienate the tribal population even further. Major reverses led to panic reactions 
including the hurried negotiation of peace accords, the most famous of which 
was the one signed on September 5, 2006, in the North Waziristan town of 
Miranshah. As part of this deal, the government of Pakistan was to stop all air 
and ground operations in Waziristan and in turn the militants were to cease 
cross-border movement into and out of Pakistan. In addition, tribal leaders were 
to ensure that no attacks took place on law enforcement personal; tribesmen 
were permitted to carry small arms but were banned from using heavy weapons. 
These terms were humiliating for a proud Army to swallow. The peace 
agreement discussed above was to an extent, a result of United States pressure, 
but also stemmed from Pakistan’s own desire to rein in some of these tribal 
areas. The compromise formula struck by Pakistani Army speaks for itself about 
the state of lawlessness in the frontier regions of Pakistan. Such compromises by 
the state, with non-state actors, do not help in either improving Pakistan’s 
stability or its international stature. The Pakistani military has fomented religious 
militancy as part of its strategy to wrest Kashmir from India, and also to establish 
a client regime in Afghanistan. Haqqani states, “Unless Islamabad’s objectives 
are redefined to focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in 
governance, which the military remains institutionally reluctant to do, the state will 
continue to turn to Islam as a national unifier.”118 The Pakistani Army, which 
holds the key to power in Pakistan, can both be the problem and the provider of 
solutions to the difficulties being faced by the country.  
The large number of military operations conducted in different parts of 
NWFP and FATA has led to the displacement of over two million people who 
                                            
118 Hussein Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," The Washington Quarterly, 
2004: 95. 
 53
were forced to abandon their homes in search of security and peace.119 Many 
consider this as the single largest displacement in the history of Pakistan, after 
partition. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center of the 
Norwegian Refugee Council: 
[t]he causes of displacement have included human rights abuses 
by militant groups, conflicts between tribal leaders and militant 
Islamic rivals, and sectarian clashes. But military operations by 
government forces, sometimes in cooperation with some militant 
groups, have been the principle cause.120 
 The affected parties in the displacement are composed of a wide variety 
of people, including Shiite and Sunni activists, as well as Deobandi and Berelvi 
Sunni activists. These groups are known to have a history of clashes over issues 
such as the control of land, water resources, and important religious sites. In 
addition, tribal enmities have often led to clashes between tribal militias, causing 
short- to long-term displacement.121 While men and woman are equally 
represented, up to 60 percent of those displaced are children, and it is these 
children who have the most to lose from displacement. In the absence of state-
funded education, it is the Madrassahs which fill in the void and further 
complicate an already vitiated environment. Children with no education, or a 
Madrassah education could become vulnerable to militant recruitment. 
3.  Role of ISI and its Impact  
The ISI was formed in 1948 by the British and was to provide a tri-service 
character to Pakistan’s existing military intelligence (MI). Its initial role beyond MI 
was to gather information on disputed areas in Kashmir and Baltistan.122 The 
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assumption of martial law over the next half-century slowly gave the ISI its 
political character. The real growth of ISI took place when the United States 
decided to expel the Soviets, using Afghan rebels. Of $200 million annual aid, the 
ISI was able to siphon off substantial cash and small arms for its own, later 
strategic use.123 With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the ISI became the lead 
agency in fomenting and coordinating the insurgency in Kashmir. These two 
major campaigns and the intervening military regimes have over a period of time 
skewed the basic character of the ISI and given it a larger-than-life role. The ISI 
has played the role of "king maker" in politics, protected military regimes, and 
coordinated insurgency in Kashmir, and has manipulated radical Islamic groups 
within Pakistan. The ISI is known to support Sunni Islamism, which is known to 
have caused wide spread ethnic strife within the state.124 Gregory further 
explains: 
[t]he role of ISI in subverting democracy and civil society in 
Pakistan, deny the people of Pakistan a legitimate outlet for their 
grievances, stifles the development of democracy and leaves much 
of the political space open to colonization by Islamists.125 
With such far-reaching roles, the ISI has become another power center 
within Pakistan, further contributing to the instability of the state. The ISI draws its 
strength from its role in Kashmir, which Pakistan considers to be the core issue 
that needs to be resolved. The continued role of the ISI in Kashmir is causing 
instability within Pakistan by interfering in domestic politics, and by not allowing 
democratic institutions to take root.  
4.  Suicide Terrorism 
Pakistan today faces one of the highest rates of suicide bombings, which  
is a trend that has existed since 2002. Between 2003 and 2009, a total of 19,165 
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people including civilians, security force personnel, and terrorists have been 
victims of this new form of attack.126 Insurgents or terrorists would typically like to 
stay alive to see the fruits of their labor. However, a lack of success through 
conventional means or competitive pressure can lead to desperation and then to 
suicide attacks. Lanche believes that "suicide bombing comes during the second 
iteration of the conflict, after the insurgents have attempted more conventional 
means.”127 He goes on to explain that: 
[s]uicide attack is a double-edged sword for a group in its quest for 
power, for it is simultaneously, a source of legitimacy and an 
incentive for others to surpass the group.128  
The Jihadi insurgents bred in the name of the LICs waged against India 
are now in a state of turmoil within Pakistan, trying to outdo each other, creating 
a civil war-like situation. Suicide attacks can also be seen from a religious 
perspective, as Pakistan raises the bulk of its Jihadi cadre in the name of 
religion. Religion can often provide a moral justification for the death and 
destruction that follows an attack and give Jihadists a sense of atonement.129 
While religion by itself does not cause violence, it can act as a catalyst to breed 
suicide terrorists. Pakistan's continued use of religion as one of the planks for 
waging LIC has caused it intense harm and has the potential to do more in the 
future. 
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E. EFFECT ON PROSPERITY 
1. Effect on Economy 
Pakistan has suffered due to internal political chaos and also due to low 
levels of foreign trust in the country’s stability. Domestic inflation jumped from 7.7 
percent in 2007 to 20.8 percent in 2008, and again to 14.2 percent in 2009. The 
Pakistani rupee has depreciated since 2005 as a result of political and economic 
instability.130 The rate of Pakistani rupees per U.S. dollar, slid from 59.51 in 2005 
to 81.41 in 2009.  Pakistan has often been rescued by U.S. economic bailout 
packages and also by not being labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism. Due to 
this U.S. policy, Pakistan has continued to receive reasonable amounts of FDI, 
and was hence able to maintain a positive growth rate of 2.7% in 2009. The 
involvement of Pakistan on its western borders with Afghanistan has also 
affected its economy and internal stability. "The Afghan Transit Trade established 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s had become the biggest 
smuggling racket in the world and had enmeshed the Taliban with Pakistani 
smugglers, transporters, drug barons, bureaucrats, politicians and police and 
army officers. Central Board of revenue estimated that Pakistan lost $80 million 
in customs revenue in the financial year 1992 and the same rose to $600 million 
in 1997, and this was in direct synchronization with Taliban expansion in 
Pakistan."131 In an International Monetary Fund working paper, Gupta states: 
[a]n analysis of 22 conflict episodes shows that armed conflict is 
associated with lower growth and higher inflation, and has adverse 
effects on tax revenues and investment. It also lends to higher 
government spending on defense, but this tends to be at the 
expense of macroeconomic stability rather than at the cost of lower 
spending on education and health. Our econometric estimates are 
consistent with the hypothesis that conflict and terrorism have a 
significant negative impact on growth through changes in the 
                                            
130 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (accessed February 21, 
2010). 
131 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,189. 
 57
composition of government spending… Thus there is potential for a 
sizable “peace dividend” for countries that are able to resolve 
conflict and terrorism.132 
In a recent World Bank 2010 report on South Asia, analysts are of the 
opinion that countries affected by conflict have shown a marked decline in growth 
and trade, when compared to countries with no conflict; this is best explained in 
Figure 5. 133 
 
 
Figure 5.   Growth and Trade in Countries With and Without Conflict in South 
Asia 
It is thus possible to see some co-relationship between the policy of LIC, 
its impact on domestic security environment, and its indirect impact on economy.  
2. Effect on Development Expenditure        
 Pakistan has seen a downward trend in real GDP growth in the last few 
decades. Real GDP growth fell from over 6% per annum in the 1980s to around 
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4% during the late 1990s. This poor performance was due to a combination of 
high interest payments on public debt and the commensurate fall in development 
expenditures over the same period.134 According to Pakistan’s Finance Division 
Policy Wing, the country witnessed a gradual decline in its governance profile in 
the 1990s, which in turn impacted the government’s ability to deliver essential 
goods and services to the poor. In addition, double-digit inflation and slowing 
industrial growth contributed to lower incomes and less employment. These 
macroeconomic imbalances resulted in reduced development expenditures and 
higher debt service payments. Domestic debt during the period 1990-1999 grew 
at an annual average rate of 16 percent, reaching almost 52 percent of GDP by 
1999, up from 44.1 percent in 1990–1991. In other words, the domestic debt 
grew fourfold, rising from PRs 488 billion to PRs 1642 billion in one decade.135 
“During the period 1991–2001, boom and bust cycles of real GDP growth, 
precipitated by agricultural growth cycles, also had a significant impact in terms 
of increasing vulnerability, as per capita real GDP growth followed a declining 
trend” (see Figure 6).136 The decline in the Pakistani economy in the 1900s, as 
discussed above, serves only to illustrate a possible link between the state of 
economy, the government’s involvement in LIC, and the consequent deterioration 
of the internal situation in Pakistan.  
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Figure 6.   Per Capita GDP Growth Rate of Pakistan 
3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
 The perception of a country being stable is vital for attracting reasonable 
FDI. “The behavior of foreign investors is always difficult to predict, as it depends 
on various factors such as wisdom, prior experience, perception and tolerance of 
economic and political risk, and long-term objectives.”137 Of the many factors 
influencing the flow of FDI, such as political stability, law and order, economic 
strength, government economic policies, government bureaucracy, local 
business environment, infrastructure, labor force, quality of life, and welcoming 
attitude, the first two factors are often deemed the most important.138 Punjab and 
Sindh, two important poles of economic growth, have seen a high rate of 
disturbance since 1989, which has accordingly discouraged growth of 
businesses.  
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Along with the poor law and order situation, a lack of political stability has 
been an important factor in Pakistan. Between 1988 and 1996, three elected 
governments were dismissed on various charges, while four caretaker regimes 
lasted for approximately 90 days each. Such rapid changes in government along 
with changes in policies and programs cannot create a conducive environment 
for foreign investors. These rapid changes in the government were not mandated 
by the wishes of the population, but were mostly orchestrated by the military, the 
ISI, and a few radical Islamic parties. The fall or change of these democratically 
elected governments was most often to appease some of the radical political 
parties, which had an agenda to support the Taliban in Afghanistan and to initiate 
terror in Kashmir. According to the World Investment Report of 2005, Pakistan’s 
inward FDI Performance Index ranking fell from 71 in 1990 to 117 in 2000, and in 
the same two corresponding years the FDI potential index fell from 92 to 130, 
and the outward FDI Performance Index rankings fell from 52 to 108.139 The 
drastic drops in these performance indices are clearly an outcome of the evolving 
internal situation in Pakistan in the post-1990s period. It is also well documented 
that a rise in terrorist threats corresponds to a proportionate increase in 
transaction costs for doing business and trade. “A doubling of the number of 
terrorist incidents is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 6%. 
Moreover, additional security measures put in place to deter terrorist attacks can 
impede the flow of goods and services.”140 
F. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL STATURE 
1. International Stature 
  Today the globalized world looks for order and stability, as these are 
considered vital for economic activity to thrive in an unhindered manner. Any 
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incident or action of a country, which is contrary to these perceptions, is likely to 
adversely affect its reputation, and its acceptance as a responsible international 
player. As Cheema notes: 
Pakistan’s image in the international community has been damaged 
due to the rise of violent extremist and fundamentalist elements in 
the society. These elements have been involved in kidnapping and 
killing foreign nationals in the country, resulting in a deteriorating 
image of Pakistan worldwide. This has aggravated the decline of 
foreign investment in Pakistan.141 
Bruce Riedel comments that Al Qaeda is said to have developed in the 
volatile mix of Afghani and Kashmiri terrorists in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden is 
said to have had a long and complex history with Pakistan and with the ISI.142  
Pakistan relied heavily on him to operationalize the Afghan movement against 
Soviet occupation. The ISI also played a key role in establishing Bin Laden’s ties 
with the Taliban when he returned to Afghanistan in 1996. According to the report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004), 
the ISI was instrumental in setting up contacts between bin Laden and the 
Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. Bin Laden and the ISI also worked together on the 
creation of Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), which was later to become the most violent 
and extreme of the Kashmiri organizations. Explaining this unholy nexus, Riedel 
notes: 
[i]n late 1999, the connections between bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the 
Kashmiris, the Taliban, and ISI were even more dramatically 
illustrated in the hijacking of an Indian airliner from Kathmandu in 
which one passenger was brutally murdered. The hijackers were 
assisted in gaining access to weapons in the airport by the local ISI 
station in Kathmandu. The hijackers sought the release of one of 
their leaders, Maulana Massoud Azhar, from a jail in India. The 
flight was diverted to Kandahar, where the Taliban protected the 
hijackers and negotiated with the Indian authorities. The ISI took 
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Azhar on a victory tour around Pakistan after the ordeal was over to 
help raise funds for the Kashmiri cause.143 
 While the world has taken note of Pakistan’s complicity, it has often been 
over looked because of its continued relevance to the United States in the global 
war on terror. It has accordingly not been branded as a state sponsor of terror in 
spite of it being fully eligible for the same. 
2. Democracy at a Standstill   
The preeminence of the Pakistani Army in the national calculus is a cause 
for concern for many people who believe in democracy. While Pakistan’s army is 
strong, the state’s dependence on its army for its cohesiveness is an area which 
needs further debate. The Pakistani Army views itself as the last bastion of 
competence, and regards all civilians with a great amount of disdain. 
Commenting on the Pakistani Army’s attitude towards the civilian establishment, 
Cohen argues: 
[t]his assessment applies to radical Islamists as much as to 
moderate Pakistanis. Nevertheless, the Army’s disdain for civilians, 
both radicals and moderates alike, will not prevent the Army and its 
intelligence service from continuing to manipulate them for 
domestic and foreign policy purposes. Pakistan’s history shows that 
the Army cannot run Pakistan effectively by itself but that the Army 
is also unwilling to entrust civilians completely with the job.144  
The international community will continue to look at Pakistan’s democracy 
as an unfinished experiment. The other major casualty in the Pakistani situation 
is its judicial system. “While it never was strong or autonomous, the judicial 
system became corrupt and politicized under the alternating governments of 
Bhutto and Sharif.”145 Along with personalization of executive power, criminal 
prosecutions were politicized. In the name of fighting terrorism, there were gross 
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violations of civil liberty, as summary military courts were established to try acts 
of political violence. As a result, some of the unintended consequences of 
breeding and exporting terrorism by Pakistan had begun to haunt it in ways that 
did not exist in its initial calculations. 
 3. Nuclear Brinkmanship 
 Pakistan’s support of the LIC in Kashmir has often caused its security 
situation to spin out of control. Pakistan’s desire to raise the stakes of LIC under 
the cover of its nuclear capability, along with India’s desire to create space for 
conventional action below the nuclear threshold, has often caused great tension 
in the region and also within the international community. The classic examples 
are the Pakistani-sponsored attacks on the Indian parliament and in Kaluchak, 
and the subsequent Indian mobilization along the Pakistani border. It was only 
the international community’s deft handling of the situation and the fear of a 
nuclear escalation that diffused the situation.146 The Pakistani policy of LIC in the 
region is a destabilizing factor and puts Pakistan itself in an uncomfortable 
position. 
G. EFFECT ON MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS 
1. Education System 
 The radicalization of the education system has serious long-term 
implications for Pakistan. Despite U.S. pressure to control the madrassas and to 
turn students away from jihadist groups, their numbers have actually grown since 
9/11. Many schools are said to openly encourage recruits to join jihadist 
organizations. Large numbers of schools breed sectarianism by harshly criticizing 
the Sufi and other more moderate Sunni interpretations of Islam.147 The world 
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needs to take note of these developments as this issue has long-term 
implications for the region and the world at large. Providing a truly liberal 
education to the next generation can be the single biggest gift Pakistan can give 
to itself. This will be one of the many long-term insurance policies that it must 
invest in, for national cohesion. 
2. Military Values 
 Prolonged exposure to anything like politics, civil administration, or un-
conventional support for insurgency or terrorism can have a deep impact on core 
military values, or on the “professionalism” of the armed forces. No one knows 
this better than Pakistani Army itself, as this was an important lesson learned 
after the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Pakistan has a long history of military rule, with a 
large number of officers holding civil appointments, both during military regimes 
and in democratic administrations. These ad-hoc appointments invariably breed 
animosity among the general population, the civil administration, and the military. 
The ISI, which works under the control of the Army, is another organization which 
is most corrupted. The ISI also spearheads all support for the militant activities of 
the insurgents, and often has an agenda of its own. Under these circumstances it 
is not always clear who is in command and whose orders are being 
implemented148.  Especially disturbing is the radicalization of junior officers in the 
ISI, who could technically receive any orders from the top, but implement what 
they think is right. The control of ISI and its restructuring are vital for Pakistan’s 
democracy, and for peace to return in the subcontinent. 
H. SUMMARY OF GAINS FROM LIC  
1. Checkmate Indian Military Superiority 
 Pakistan, by virtue of adopting the strategy of LIC, has been able to bottle  
up a large number of Indian Army soldiers in the Kashmir Valley as they conduct 
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counterinsurgency operations. The term low-intensity conflict is actually a 
misnomer, because for the country conducting the LIC, the operations on the 
ground are demanding and fairly intensive.149 Due to ongoing LIC operations, 
India continues to invest substantial resources in procuring military hardware that 
is specific to combating insurgency. These LIC-related procurements are often at 
the cost of other basic hardware that is required for defensive or offensive 
operations. Thus it is fair to say that LIC has tied down disproportionate numbers 
of Indian troops in the valley, thereby making them unavailable for operations in 
other sectors when the need arises. 
2. Impose High Economic Costs on India 
  The continuous employment of the Army in protracted LIC operations 
within the country, in addition to being undesirable in a democracy, also imposes 
high costs in terms of men and material. When armed forces are used in an LIC 
over prolonged periods of time, their credibility often tends to go down.150 India 
spends close to $3 billion annually for maintenance of its forces in the Kashmir 
Valley.151 In addition, it spent close to $300 million for construction of the security 
fence along its borders with Pakistan to seal off infiltration from across the 
borders.152 The high incidence of terrorist actions within the Kashmir Valley has 
scuttled or delayed large number of developmental activities, and those 
completed have mostly incurred cost overruns. The spread of LIC into the Indian 
hinterland can have long-term consequences on foreign investor confidence, 
which can have a direct impact on FDI. 
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3. Kashmir on International Agenda 
  Pakistan’s continued aid to the LIC in Kashmir has ensured high rates of 
terrorist incidents in the Valley, which keeps the issue of Kashmir alive in the 
international media. Pakistan also uses these incidents to garner both moral and 
financial support from other like-minded countries. In addition, it is also able to 
keep the issue of Kashmir alive in international forums such as the United 
Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Another indirect benefit for 
Pakistan has been reduced foreign policy options for India in South Asia and the 
world at large. 
4. Lead Actor Status in the Muslim World 
 Pakistan, by espousing the cause of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley, has 
been able to take a leadership position in the Muslim Umma. Commenting on the 
role of Islam, Nasr observed: 
Islam increased Pakistan's regional power by opening new foreign 
policy possibilities before Islamabad, most notably in using jihadi 
activism to deal with developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir.153 
 Continued unrest in the Kashmir Valley provided Pakistan with a platform 
to remain relevant, and from which to influence events in the state. Kashmir also 
acts as a rallying point for Pakistan to obtain financial support from other Muslim 
countries, to continue its fight for the so-called oppressed Muslim populations 
around the world. 
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I. MAIN LOSSES FROM LIC 
1. Instability within Pakistan 
a. Radicalization of Society 
  The desire of Pakistan to fuel the cycle of LIC in India has taken the 
country along the path of Islamic radicalization. The political elite and the 
intelligence agencies of Pakistan, have consistently used religious fervor to gain 
and sustain support for militant activities, both within the state and across the 
borders. This, over a period of time has led to blowback effects within the country 
in the form of sectarian violence, and revolt against the established authority, as 
the State is not considered sufficiently Muslim. Any attempt to enforce order by 
the state often starts a cycle of violence, as most of the militant organizations 
have an agenda of their own, and are no longer under the control of those who 
created them. 
b. Alienation of Frontier Regions and Internal 
Displacement of People (IDP) 
  The semblance of peace that existed in the NWFP of Pakistan 
three decades ago has been replaced by extreme violence and radical Islamic 
propaganda. Pakistan initially used the tribes of this region to wage a jihad 
against Soviet occupation, and later used them to fuel the insurgency in Kashmir. 
The country had to start fighting these very tribes in the post-9/11 scenario, as 
they began to target U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan and later target Pakistan’s 
armed forces. The intense fighting in the region has led to large-scale IDP, 
causing social unrest, and the creation of a fresh breeding ground for a new 
generation of terrorists.  
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c. Possible Pay Back 
  External backing of an insurgency often creates a chain reaction, 
where one state’s support for a guerrilla group can lead its adversary to provide 
assistance to the other countries’ foes.154 The positive aspect of payback is that 
it can put caution in the mind of the government as to the level of its involvement 
in the insurgency. Byman further explains 
[m]any governments around the world that have restive minorities or other 
potential dissidents remained concerned that an aggressive policy abroad 
may lead the rivals to foment discontent at home. Iran, for example, was 
willing to forgo opportunities to extend its regional influence by supporting 
coreligionists in Central Asia and the Caucasus mostly out of fear that 
other states would do the same to Iran.155 
 Pakistan, by sponsoring insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir, has created 
a possible vulnerability in its own backyard, in the trouble-torn regions of 
Baluchistan, Sindh, and the NWFP area. 
2. Effect on Prosperity  
a. State of Economy 
  Pakistan’s involvement in LIC across the borders and its 
consequent impact on its own domestic situation is most evident on the 
economic front. Pakistan was only able to average a growth rate of 2.5 percent in 
GDP in the 1990s, after having achieved an average growth rate of over 6 
percent in the 1980s.156  This clearly coincides with Pakistan’s involvement in 
LIC and reflects the period during which it backfired. Highlighting some of the 
intangible aspects of LIC and prolonged conflict, Gupta explains: 
[o]ver and above the economic costs, prolonged armed conflicts 
can impose significant social and political costs that are difficult to 
estimate. For example, it is not possible to quantify the intangible 
costs of violence and insecurity, the human suffering and trauma, 
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the breakdown in law and order, the animosity and mistrust that are 
created among warring parties, and the adverse effects of the 
reduced stock of health and education endowments on the long run 
growth prospect of a country.157 
b.  State of Development 
  The decrease in real GDP growth rate in Pakistan can be attributed 
to a number of factors such as poor economic policies, bad governance, or, more 
importantly, a deteriorating law and order situation. Pakistan’s domestic debt 
grew at an annual average rate of 16% during the period 1990-99, reaching 
almost 52% of GDP by 2000.158 One of the main reasons for such high debts is 
increased military expenditure, which has increased in recent years due to the 
Pakistani Army’s involvement in counterinsurgency operations. Presently a large 
portion of this is being subsidized by the United States as the targeted militants 
are seen as common enemies. The situation is likely to worsen once American 
interest wanes, and the funding stops for these efforts. Analyzing military 
expenditures, Gupta notes 
[m]ilitary expenditures typically increase in response to conflict and 
terrorism, and tend to remain high even after cessation of violence. 
Higher spending for security can also affect the composition of 
public spending by decreasing outlays for education, health, and 
other productive items. Moreover, the destruction of physical 
infrastructure and human capital due to violence, and the indirect 
effects on trade, tourism and business confidence, all weaken the 
fiscal position and adversely affect economic growth.159 
 Thus, Pakistan’s involvement in first aiding LIC, and then combating the 
aftereffects of LIC in the form of counterinsurgency operations are now hurting 
Pakistan economically and the situation is likely to worsen with passage of time. 
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c. State of FDI 
  Pakistan has not been able to harness the full power of 
globalization, as a large number of multinational companies do not see it as a 
preferred investment destination, due to its internal security situation. Highlighting 
the situation in Pakistan, Cheema notes that: 
[a]mong the major reasons for the poor position with regard to 
foreign investment is the generally negative perception of Pakistan 
in international business circles. Images of gun-toting, anti-Western 
Islamic fundamentalists, sectarian warfare and rumors of war with 
India are common enough. Nor does it help to know that there is an 
unaccountable military regime in office, while the judiciary appears 
incapable of delivering independent judgments in the event of clash 
of interests between the foreign or domestic investors on one hand 
and the government on the other. Finally, the significant exodus of 
indigenous capital and entrepreneurs to Canada, the United States, 
and elsewhere is hardly encouraging for potential foreign 
investors.160 
 While the country has benefitted from its role as a partner of United States 
in GWOT, it has not been able to improve global investor confidence. 
2. Effect on International Stature 
a. World View of Pakistan 
  Pakistan's continued desire to prosecute an LIC against India has 
led to the establishment into an unholy nexus of the state with a large number of 
dubious non-state actors. In the pre-9/11 period this was largely seen as a South 
Asian problem, and was hence overlooked by the Western powers. Now with all 
major terrorist attacks around the world having been linked to Pakistan in one 
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Byman calls Pakistan the most important omission in the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism, due to its long established support for terrorists fighting in Kashmir and 
of the Taliban fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan.161 
b. Impact on Democracy 
  Pakistan's involvement in LIC, from the time of independence, has 
given the military a preeminent position of power and responsibility, both in 
domestic and international affairs. The Pakistani Army looks at civilian leadership 
with great disdain and contempt, for their inability to govern efficiently. The Army 
has consistently stepped in to take over the reins of the government whenever it 
has perceived that law and order is out of control. Pakistan's return to a true 
democracy will always be suspect, as long as the Pakistani Army exerts a 
disproportionate influence on government. The army's influence on government 
will remain as long as Pakistan uses LIC as an instrument of state strategy in its 
neighborhood. 
c. Threat to Nuclear Facilities/ Weapons 
  Pakistan's association with LIC over prolonged periods of time has 
led to the increased “Talibanization” of the country. Domestic and foreign jihadist 
groups, along with the Taliban, have cross-fertilized with local Islamist groups in 
Pakistan to produce explosive ideologies, whose main agenda is violence and 
destruction.162 The instability created by these extremist groups has alarmed the 
international community about the safety of the nuclear stockpile held by 
Pakistan. The single biggest threat to the Western community from Weapons of 
Mass Destruction(WMD), which would result from the availability of a nuclear 
device in the hands of any terrorist group. Among all nuclear capable countries, 
 
 
                                            
161 Daniel L. Byman, "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," 1. 
162 Byman, "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," 10. 
 72
Pakistan remains the weakest link in nuclear safety, and accordingly the world at 
large is worried about the situation. Discussing the issue of nuclear risks, Clary 
points out 
Pakistan may have nuclear security measures as effective as any 
other nuclear power, but those nuclear weapons face greater risks 
than those in almost any other nuclear state… The true source of 
nuclear risk in Pakistan is the insecurity of Pakistan. Reducing that 
instability must the focus of decision-makers in Islamabad, 
Washington, and Delhi.163 
J. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT SITUATION IN PAKISTAN 
 Pakistan today realizes the seriousness of the threat to its internal 
security, but there seems to be some ambiguity as to which of the existential 
threats are the most serious and need immediate attention. Most security experts 
consider sectarianism and the growing jihadi culture as the most serious of these 
threats. The impact of LIC on internal security or on democracy in Pakistan is still 
not in the open domain, and hence is not openly debated by the intelligentsia. 
This ostrich-like approach by Pakistan will neither help the country nor the world. 
Identification of the key issues that need immediate attention is fundamental to 
solving the problems in Pakistan. 
1. Financing the Militants 
 Over the last two decades, Pakistan has been openly professing moral 
support for the insurgency in Kashmir.164 In addition to providing moral support 
to Kashmiri insurgents, Pakistan also provides financial aid to a large number of 
insurgent organizations in Kashmir. Explaining the scope of terrorist financing, 
Chalk points out: 
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[a]ccording to India's Research and Analysis Wing [RAW], annual 
ISI expenditure to the main militant organizations runs to between 
U.S. $125 to $250 million per year. These funds are used to cover 
salaries for fighters [which run from Rs.5000-Rs.10,000 a month], 
support for next of kin, cash incentives for high risk operations and 
retainers for guides, porters and informers. The ISI manages to 
fund the militant proxies through the circulation of counterfeit 
currency and by laundering profits derived from the heroin trade.165 
 Financing of an LIC invariably leads the nation and its agencies to resort 
to non-traditional funding mechanisms, which by themselves can be 
destabilizing. Prolonged engagements in these activities can lead to the creation 
of independent power centers and splinter organizations, which often may have 
an agenda of their own.  
2. Role of the ISI 
 Recurrent periods of military rule have given a larger-than-life image to the 
ISI. The use or abuse of the ISI has been a phenomenon since the time of 
General Zia Ul Haq, and over a period of time the organization has spread its 
tentacles into politics, electoral rigging, terrorism financing, and other non-
intelligence activities. The ISI, which is under the firm control of the military, has 
always championed the cause of military rulers and helped them survive.166 
Commenting on the role of the ISI, Rizvi is of the view  that “[t]heir role in state 
politics has undoubtedly borne all-around negative implications for the natural 
growth of political parties in Pakistan.”167 This institutionalization of the role of the 
ISI in Pakistani domestic politics is a cause of concern for the future of 
democracy. It also puts a question mark on the ability of democratically-elected 
representatives to control the state intelligence agency, which is essential for 
civilian control of the armed forces. 
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3. Pakistani Army 
 The army continues to exert a disproportionate influence over the 
government, especially on issues relating to foreign affairs and defense. The 
Army's preoccupation with issues relating to Kashmir and Afghanistan makes it 
vulnerable to manipulation by radical Islamist elements, as it depends on them 
for support in waging the jihad. Presently the Army is under intense pressure 
from the United States to weed out extremist elements on its borders with 
Afghanistan, as these continue to inflict casualties on U.S.-led forces. Adding fuel 
to fire have been the strikes on Taliban hideouts in Pakistan by United States 
helicopters and drones. The Pakistani Army's offensives action in the NWFP and 
U.S. drone strikes have been unpopular, and have been the cause of increased 
attacks on both Pakistani Army posts and United States supply convoys. The 
Army is balancing its approach in order to appease both the Americans and the 
Afghan Taliban, which is affecting its credibility.  
4. Democracy 
 While democracy has been in place for the last three years, the Army 
continues to call the shots in Pakistan. Institutional mechanisms for democratic 
control of the armed forces such as a strong ministry of defense and budgetary 
controls on defense spending do not exist. The United States' continued 
dependence on the Pakistani Army for action on the ground in its GWOT is also 
not helping the cause of democracy. The strategic aims of Pakistan in Kashmir 
and Afghanistan appear to impede democratization, as it raises the importance of 
the army, which actively coordinates the LIC. As a consequence, the LIC in 
Kashmir is coming in the way of democracy in Pakistan. 
K. CONCLUSION 
 The Pakistani Army is one of the few professional armies in the world to 
still rely on irregulars such as tribals or mujahedin for the conduct of regular war. 
In spite of repeated failures, it has not been able to comprehend the diminishing 
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returns and the long-term impacts on the professionalism of its army, due to the 
use of these non-state actors. Its experiences in 1947 and 1965 should have 
given the Pakistanis a sense of the “holding power” of these actors in a 
conventional conflict; these fighters invariably crack as an entity when under 
pressure. While the use of irregulars facilitates diplomatic deniability, it also 
attracts damaging international attention.168 With the increasing availability of 
satellite monitoring and other electronic means, along with worldwide concern 
over non-state actors, the leverage available in the conduct of an LIC is definitely 
decreasing. The low returns from LIC when combined with the disturbing 
instability that it brings, should act as a disincentive for prospective players of 
LIC. Articulating his views on the difficulty of measuring the costs of terrorism, 
Gold explains 
[t]errorist incidents impose large direct costs upon individuals and 
societies. The immediate costs can be measured in terms of the 
economic value of the lives lost and property destroyed in terrorist 
incidents. These measures are usually derived by estimating the 
present market value of the projected future production of the lost 
human and physical assets. This does not mean that all losses can 
be reduced to purely market calculations. The emotional toll 
imposed on victims, relatives, friends, other survivors and a broad 
range of community members is quite real, and while the legal 
system does try to measure these losses – pain and suffering, for 
example – there is an important sense in which the usual methods 
of quantifying costs are insufficient.169 
 Pakistan is today under tremendous international pressure to come clean 
on its role in perpetuating terrorism. As the GWOT comes to a close, Pakistan 
will be asked more questions than it can answer. A recently released U.S. study 
alludes to the future of terrorism as,  “For those terrorist groups active in 2025, 
the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the 
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world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.”170 With these kinds of 
projected scenarios, it is best to identify the epicenters of terrorism now and find 
solutions for the future. The study of the Pakistan situation should help in 
understanding the long-term implications, and the pitfalls of using insurgency and 
terrorism as a state strategy. The solution may lie in Pakistan helping itself, with 
the rest of the world nudging it along. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The attitudes and policies of Pakistan towards itself, Afghanistan, and 
India, will decide the future course of events in the troubled regions of South 
Asia. The evolution and manifestations of these policies and attitudes can be 
greatly influenced by the policies and actions taken by the United States in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent in India. While Pakistan and the 
United States are likely to act in their own self-interest, it is important to identify a 
possible convergence of interests leading to a common end-state, which is 
acceptable to both.171 Positive developments in the region can emerge with the 
United States creating the right environment by incentivizing good behavior by 
Pakistan, and Pakistan accepting them as good enough reasons to change. This 
entire process of change can be further facilitated by responsible actions and 
policies on the part of India. This change in mindset by Pakistan must be driven 
by a clear realization that its policy of LIC is causing it more harm than good and 
that it needs to dismantle the physical infrastructure that is in place today, which 
continuously feeds the LIC. It also needs to take a second look at providing "just 
the moral support,” as this kind of support without material support may not be 
acceptable to militant groups, and may cause more harm in the long run.  An 
analysis of the net gains and losses from its strategy of supporting LIC should 
convince Pakistan to undertake an immediate re-appraisal of its policies. 
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B. WAY AHEAD FOR PAKISTAN 
1. Introduction 
The proxy war, or LIC, in Kashmir has been a conscious strategy on the 
part of Pakistan from the time it gained independence in 1947. It was able to 
unleash the full power of LIC in the 1990s due to the opportunities presented by 
India in Kashmir. Pakistan saw it as a cost-effective strategy to bleed India, and 
accordingly adopted the strategy of LIC, and put in place an elaborate 
infrastructure to support these operations. The initial success spurred the nation 
into believing that it was the right way forward. The events of 9/11, Pakistan's  
reversal of its policy of supporting the Taliban, and effective control of insurgency 
by India in Kashmir, together created a situation in which the militants trained by 
Pakistan began seeing Pakistan itself as the wrongdoer and hence the target. 
Sartaj Aziz, a former foreign and finance minister of Pakistan, mentions that "[f]or 
every ten [militants] who are trained here to fight in Kashmir, one goes and the 
rest stay in Pakistan to cause trouble."172 While this shows the concern of 
Pakistani elite about the problems of its support for the radical mujahedeen, they 
have not been able to develop an alternate strategy. India, which considers 
Kashmir to be an integral part of the country, will not give up possession of the 
state under any circumstance. The solution to the vexed problem of Kashmir lies 
in the reconciliation of the situation by Pakistan. International pressure and the 
deteriorating internal situation in the country, as well as the realization that the 
gains from LIC are far less than the losses, should compel Pakistan to change 
course. Some key issues that need to be resolved as it changes its policy are 
discussed below.  
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2. Clarify its Stand on LIC 
 It is time for Pakistan to re-clarify its position on its support to militants 
operating from its soil. Musharraf, in a major policy speech on January 12, 2002, 
publicly declared 
[t]o limit the influence of Islamic militants at home, including those 
previously described by him as “Kashmiri freedom fighters.” “No 
organizations will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of 
Kashmir,” he declared, “Whoever is involved with such acts in the 
future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or 
outside the country.”173 
 The above commitment by the General was under substantial pressure 
from both the United States and India (due to the massive buildup of troops along 
its borders). Pakistan's commitment to delink itself from the Afghan Taliban, 
immediately after 9/11 was again under tremendous pressure from the United 
States. Musharraf said then, “violence and terrorism have been going on for 
years and we are weary and sick of this Kalashnikov culture ... The day of 
reckoning has come.”174 Pakistan needs to clarify its position to itself, and the 
international community, and be counted as a responsible player. The course 
that Pakistan adopts in future, would have direct impact on the well-being of 
Pakistan. In 1992, General Sood opined: 
[t]he days of contradictory stance appear to be over, and Islamabad 
will have to choose between continuing as a terrorist state, 
sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir and shedding its cloak of 
innocence and respectability, or abjuring its violent part, for as Ayub 
Khan had once stated: “how long can we endanger Pakistan for the 
sake of Kashmir?”175  
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3. Clarify its Stand on Role of Religion 
While Pakistan was born out of a need for a separate land for Muslims, it 
was still very much secular in character. Most leaders, from Jinnah to Musharraf, 
have fundamentally laid faith in a secular system. Some leaders did change 
course, both due to political pressures and the desire to stay in power. General 
Zia radicalized the religious institutions in order to wage LIC and since then 
radical Islamist groups have gained in strength and become more politically 
active. Highlighting the dilemma of religion in Pakistan, Davis observes: 
[a] second trend encouraged by the radicalization of religious 
parties has been of more recent providence and far less violent but 
may prove in the long run more significant. This is the growing 
tension in society between Islamists and secularists in which 
‘government’ is taking a decidedly ambivalent position.176 
The demands for Islamization in Pakistan can be countered by 
strengthening civil society and by encouraging growth of secular political parties. 
On the other hand, whenever political parties or the regimes seek the support of 
Islamists to garner political legitimacy or to achieve strategic objectives, it is the 
Islamists who win. 
4. Belief in Democracy 
Pakistan was born a democracy, but the spirit of democracy was soon lost 
to a maze of factors that included domestic political turmoil, obsession with 
Kashmir, and the gradual change from a secular state to an Islamic state. 
Pakistan's close relationship with the United States did not help in its 
transformation into a truly democratic state, as it was a "marriage of 
convenience." Initially Pakistan was required to contain China, and then to oust 
the Soviets from Afghanistan, and more recently to bring stability in Afghanistan. 
Explaining the American attitude to Pakistan, Cohen states, 
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[t]he American agenda was clear: a pro-western Pakistan, a stable 
Pakistan, a prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic Pakistan were 
all desirable, but not in that order.177 
 Pakistan's transition to a true democracy would have to be driven by its 
genuine desire for peace in the region. This desire will reduce the power and 
influence of the military, and as a consequence Pakistan will need to abstain 
from its present policy of using LIC as a state strategy. This will automatically 
reduce the role of both the Army and the radical Islamist elements, and will allow 
democratic institutions to take root and flourish.    
5. Build Capacity and Willingness to Fight Terror  
Once Pakistan decides to change course in its strategy of LIC, it will have 
to dismantle the infrastructure that has been in place for years. Dismantling the 
physical infrastructure, such as training camps or launch pads would be easy, but 
the difficult part would be in handling the human component. People trained to 
wage LIC would have to be de-radicalized and then rehabilitated so as to do 
mainstream work. Simultaneously, there would be a need to professionalize 
organizations like the ISI, and wean it away from domestic politics. This would be 
a long and difficult task, and may require certain amount of international help. 
Alluding to the lack of capacity within Pakistan to fight terrorism, Hussein 
observes 
[o]ne of the biggest problems for the Pakistani state is the absence 
of an organized and dedicated infrastructure to combat, contain and 
crush terrorism in a sophisticated and scientific manner. Pakistan is 
now building this infrastructure with United States assistance, while 
the government will also have to reorder priorities for the 
intelligence agencies, shifting their focus away from domestic 
political intelligence towards counterterrorism.”178 
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 While the Pakistani Army is designed for conventional war against India, it 
is the Frontier Corps (FC), which is responsible for counterinsurgency operations, 
but it is poorly trained, and is often sympathetic to some of the insurgent groups. 
The police have little or no capacity to handle the internal situation, as the 
population has no trust in them.179 Correcting these anomalies is one of the 
challenges before Pakistan in the short- to medium-term periods. 
6. Conclusion 
 It is time for Pakistan to realize that its policy in Kashmir is not paying 
back, and that its hope of "bleeding India into concessions - a strategy that has to 
date failed to change India's negotiating position or to weaken India's resolve,"180 
is a non-starter. The gap in conventional military capabilities between India and 
Pakistan continues to widen. According to a recent RAND Corporation study, 
India spent five times more than Pakistan on defense in 2006.181 Vested 
interests within Pakistan continue to block any alternate options to resolve the 
issues with India. A state of confrontation with India on the Kashmir issue is in 
the interest of the military, and to a certain extant the political elites. This 
deadlock can only be resolved by either a popular mass action, or by external 
pressure.  
C. FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE USA 
 The United States has multiple objectives to keep Pakistan engaged, with 
the most important being the partnership to fight the war on terror in Afghanistan. 
It also requires continued intelligence inputs from the Pakistani ISI on Al Qaeda 
activities, within and outside Pakistan. It also expects Pakistan to deny its 
territory for all radical Islamist groups, who wish to train and mount attacks on 
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United States assets all over the world.182 Under these circumstances, getting 
Pakistan right is an enormous challenge for the United States. “In the past, short 
term gains always have had priority for the United States over long term 
concerns, when it comes to Pakistan. Today, ignoring the long term could have 
grave consequences.”183 The United States must find a way of halting the 
production of Jihadi militants from Pakistan. The U.S. may have to link its aid to 
actual reforms on the ground. Pakistan will remain central to the war on terrorism 
and to that extent the U.S. will have to engage any regime that is in power and 
support a transition to a relatively stable self-sustaining state. Explaining 
American foreign policy, Riedel observes: 
[f]or the last sixty years American policy toward Pakistan has 
oscillated wildly between periods when Washington was entranced 
by Islamabad and embraced its policies without question 
(Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan and Bush 43), or sanctioned Pakistan 
and blamed it for either provoking wars or developing nuclear 
weapons (Johnson, Carter, Bush 41 and Clinton). In the love-affair 
years, Washington would build secret relationships (the U-2 base in 
Peshawar and the mujahideen war in the 1980s) and throw literally 
billions of dollars at Pakistan with little or no accountability. In the 
scorned years, Pakistan would be démarched to death and 
Washington would cut off all military and economic aid. Both 
approaches failed dismally.184 
It is now time for the Americans to develop a coherent policy for Pakistan, which 
will look at the long-term interests of both Pakistan and the United States. 
1. Re-examination of State Sponsors of Terror    
 Experts are of the opinion that the existing approach towards identifying 
state sponsors of terror is flawed and often biased.185 The current list of state 
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sponsors of terror according to the U.S. Department of State is in Table 1.186 
One glaring omission is Pakistan, which has long aided terrorist groups fighting 
against India in Kashmir and is also a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting 
the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan. In addition, countries like Venezuela 
and Yemen are part of the problem, as they deliberately look the other way when 
their citizens support terrorist groups.187 Some of these countries can be more 
dangerous than the countries listed in Table 1, as they have Islamic jihadi links. 
Addressing this issue, Byman states:  
[t]he United States should consider creating a list of passive 
sponsors and activities in an attempt to “name and shame” them 
into better behavior, using as a model the “transparency index” that 
measures the level of corruption in countries around the world.188 
 
Country Designation Date 
Cuba March 1, 1982 
Iran January 19, 1984 
Sudan August 12, 1993 
Syria December 29, 1979 
Table 1.   List of State Sponsors of Terrorism: U.S. Department Of State 
  As America continues to take help from Pakistan in its GWOT, it will need 
to calibrate its response on the issue of naming Pakistan as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, as it has the potential to backfire in either of the options. In case it 
attempts to brand Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror, it may spell the end of 
present cooperation; in the case that the status-quo is maintained, the United 
States must be prepared for prolonged operations in Afghanistan. Any action 
taken by the United States must pose a visible threat, or threat in being, for 
Pakistan to change its attitude. 
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 Among the many countries that profess anti-American feelings, Pakistan 
takes the lead due to a combination of historical and present day reasons. 
Pakistan also accuses America for many wrongs that are happening within the 
country, in spite of the large amount of aid being received from the United States. 
Kizilbash identifies three main reasons for the anti-American feelings in Pakistan: 
[o]ne involves U.S. policies towards Pakistan such as failure to 
come to Pakistan's aid during the Bangladesh crisis, using Pakistan 
for its own interests, and its position to Pakistan's peaceful nuclear 
program. A second deals with American global policy, including 
support of Israel, opposition to Iran's present government, and the 
use of force against small Third World nations. The third includes 
American involvement in Pakistan - for example, support of the 
Military regime, obstructing the settlement of the Afghani issue, and 
responsibility for the decline in the value of the local currency.189 
 It is important for America to identify the root causes of this deep-rooted 
acrimony and find a way out, as this has an indirect effect on homegrown 
terrorism within United States.190 
3. Bolster Counter Terror Capacity 
 The United States can help Pakistan build up the required capacity to fight 
domestic terrorism, in terms of technology, training, and tactics. Byman 
observes, “capacity without will is meaningless.”191 Willingness to fight domestic 
terror and terror outside its borders, can be induced by causing embarrassment 
and also by attaching a stigma to Pakistan's actions.192 The amount of pressure 
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that needs to be applied invariably requires due calibration, as any undue 
pressure could undermine the very existence of the civilian government. 
4. Help Democratize Pakistan 
 The United States must slowly move away from its dependence on 
Pakistan Army for achievement of its strategic goals in the region.  The close 
relationship between the US and the Pakistan Army is seen with great concern 
by the civilian elites, who see this alliance coming in the way of development of 
democracy.193  For long term stability in the region and for democracy to take 
roots, United States must reduce its engagement with Pakistan defense forces.  
This disengagement may difficult at this stage when it is dependent on Pakistan 
Army for tactical intelligence and logistic support, but it is essential for long term 
peace in the region. 
5. Help Safeguard Nuclear Assets 
 Pakistan is known to have been involved in the diffusion of nuclear 
technology, through the AQ Khan network.194  The United States must help 
Pakistan implement suitable measures to safeguard its nuclear arsenal and 
prevent any illicit proliferation.  In the back drop of current militant activity in the 
region, it is also important to physically secure the nuclear warheads, and 
towards this end the United States may provide help in the form of the provision 
of technology for access doors, vaults, surveillance gear and other instruments 
for material accounting.195  
6. Repackaging of Aid 
  The large amount of aid being provided by the United States must 
facilitate in the transformation of Pakistan into a responsible democratic nation. 
                                            
193 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 304. 
194 Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 107. 
195 Ibid. 
 87
America's continued need for Pakistan in terms of logistics, intelligence, airspace 
and some Pakistani boots on ground, would put conflicting demands on its policy 
makers.196 The United States will have to put in place long-term plans for 
development of Pakistan, and commit itself to fulfilling them, and convince the 
Pakistani's of their resolve to do it.  Any such commitment by United States will 
further stretch its already strained economy.  The challenge for United States lies 
in calibrating the quantum of aid provided to a corresponding visible change in 
attitude of Pakistan.  
7. Help Improve Relations between India and Pakistan 
 A stable South Asia is in the long-term interest of the United States, as it 
helps reduce the risk of another Indo-Pakistani war, and also facilitate in the 
maintenance of balance of power in the region.197 The primary area of 
divergence between the U.S. and Pakistan, is Pakistan's policies towards 
Kashmir and its relation with India.  While the United States would like to see 
Pakistan using only peaceful means to resolve the Kashmir issue, Pakistan is 
intent on using LIC as a tool to achieve its aim.  Pakistan's continued use of LIC 
in Kashmir is not only destabilizing Pakistan from within, it is also affecting the 
war on terror by the U.S. in Afghanistan, as militants seamlessly operate on both 
sides of Pakistan's borders.  The United States can help convince Pakistan that 
resolving Kashmir issue is in its long-term interest, and that it must not expect a 
plebiscite or any substantial changes in existing borders in Kashmir. In return, the 
United States could offer Pakistan peaceful nuclear cooperation, provide 
Islamabad a missile defense and provide other conventional military hardware.198 
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8. Conclusion  
 In dealing with Pakistan, United States must avoid temptations for short-
term gains, and must seriously look at consolidating the political structure of 
Pakistan.  While engaging the military is a necessity in the short term, to get 
assistance in the war on terror, Washington will have to focus on restoring 
democracy in the true sense.199 LIC being waged by Pakistan must be viewed in 
a holistic manner, as it has the capacity to affect the course of events both in 
Afghanistan and in Kashmir.  All the components involved in waging LIC, i.e. the 
Jihadists, the ISI, the Army and even the political leadership will have to be 
addressed to tackle this menace.  Alluding to this, Cohen argues 
American policymakers must look beyond al Qaeda to troubling 
developments within Pakistan and consider the possibility that 
Pakistan, an ally, might become a major threat to a number of 
American interests.200 
 Getting Pakistan right is no easy task, as the United States will have to 
balance competing interests and take into account the effects of its policies in the 
short and the long run.201  "Pakistan will continue to be an expanding source of 
long term security threat"202, unless the U.S. initiates measures to wean it away 
from its desire to achieve strategic gains through the use of LIC. 
D. OPTIONS FOR INDIA 
 India has been on the receiving end of the adverse consequences of LIC 
and international terrorism, long before the world’s recognition of terrorism as a 
truly global menace. Post-independence, Pakistan made a number of attempts to 
undermine Indian governance in Kashmir, by fueling insurgency with the 
provision of men and material from across the border. Until now, India has 
                                            
199 Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 114. 
200 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 306. 
201 Ibid., 
202 Ashley J. Tellis, "US Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," 114. 
 89
managed to contain the situation through a combination of police and military 
action along with delivery of better governance. Pakistan's actions have certainly 
impeded India’s progress, but India has shown marked resilience in not 
escalating the situation. Pakistan was particularly emboldened to raise the ante 
in the 1990s due to its acquisition of a nuclear capability. Pakistan deduced that 
its nuclear capability provided a shield from conventional reprisal by India, while 
India always tried to create some space for it. The Kargil war of 1999, clarified 
three aspects one, the limitations of what can be achieved by so-called non-state 
actors; two, there exists some space between nuclear and conventional wars 
under certain circumstances; three, the tolerance of international players for 
cross-border transgressions is limited. India, along with the United States, is an 
important player, and what India does directly impacts Pakistan's actions and its 
options thereof. 
1. Govern Kashmir Better 
 Providing quality governance will be the single biggest step in solving the 
vexed problem of Kashmir. Better governance provides space for maneuver to 
the Indian government in the international arena and in turn denies space for 
international interference.203 India has identified the problem in Kashmir as a 
socio-economic-political problem, which requires comprehensive solution.  It will 
need to integrate the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with the rest of India and also 
replicate the pan India economic success in this hill state. A pre-requisite for 
investment in the state, is a better security situation, and having achieved that 
the administration must invest in the strengths of Kashmir to include tourism, 
handicrafts and hospitality sectors.  Once there is a semblance of stability, India 
could consider giving the state limited autonomy within the provisions of the 
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Indian constitution, to further ameliorate the feelings of the population.  Jammu 
and Kashmir presently enjoys certain amount of autonomy under Article 370 of 
the Indian Constitution. 
2. Isolate the Problem to Kashmir 
India must contain the insurgency to the Kashmir valley, and not allow its 
spread to the rest of the state, and definitely not to rest of the country.  This will 
require focused efforts in the Jammu and Ladakh regions of Jammu & Kashmir 
state, and other insurgency affected areas of India. India must address the 
Maoist problems and the separatist tendencies of North- East India through 
effective Centre-State coordination.  Any laxity on this front would automatically 
provide larger playing field to Pakistan, and provide further incentives for LIC.   
3. Leverage Indian Muslim Population  
 India, which is home to over 150 million Muslims, constituting 13.4% of the 
Indian population, is truly a multi-ethnic country living in peace, albeit with 
occasional flare-ups. India has a large Muslim community, which is next only to 
Indonesia and Pakistan. Commenting on the status of Muslims in India, Puri 
explains: 
[h]aving been exposed to the two great civilizations   of the world, 
Indian and western, they are, intellectually and culturally, the most 
richly endowed Muslim community of the world. Nowhere else did 
Islam confront as ancient a civilization, as speculative and 
pluralistic philosophical thought, and as non-combative but resilient 
a faith as in India. Similarly, no other Muslim community has had as 
long and direct an exposure to the rationalism, modern knowledge 
and institutions of the west.204 
 The plurality of India, in terms of its religions, languages, customs and 
traditions, is the strength of India and Kashmir is no exception. The large strength 
of liberal Muslims in India could be mobilized to showcase the peaceful co-
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existence of Hindus and Muslims across India for over half a century. Muslim 
intelligentsia could highlight the freedom and opportunities that Muslims enjoy in 
India, when compared to many other parts of the world. This will effectively 
neutralize Pakistani propaganda of the state of Muslims in India and more 
specifically the opportunities for the Muslims of Kashmir.  Under these 
circumstances India sees legitimacy in its control of Kashmir, and not allow its 
separation merely on the grounds that it has majority Muslim population.  
4. Upgrade India’s Counterinsurgency Capability 
 India has been home to insurgencies almost since independence, and has 
been fighting the same in the North and Eastern part of India.  The Maoist 
insurgency, spread across the length of India, is the next big challenge for India.  
India will have to invest in upgrading its skills in combating LIC, as it needs to 
contain the extremist elements in Kashmir and prevent the spread of Maoist 
culture to other parts of India.  While India can claim to be experts in this 
business, it lacks technological finesse to fight without collateral damage.  This 
up gradation in technology and tactics will not only prevent Pakistan from gaining 
an upper hand in Kashmir, but will also discourage them from further fueling 
insurgency. 
5. Is "Tit for Tat" an Option? 
 When a country launches an LIC against another country, it is the fear of 
"pay-back" that normally puts caution into the minds of the host nation. In the 
case of Pakistan, there seems to be some realization of this possibility, but it is 
intent on exploiting the contents of "Gujral Doctrine," which defines India's 
relations with her neighbors. The Gujral doctrine was viewed as marking a 
serious policy change in India’s relations with its smaller neighbors. Explaining 
some of its key policy aspects, Sundaralingam notes that 
[i]ts central theme was to reassure its neighbors that India did not 
have expansionist or ulterior motives, and it is set out through five 
basic principles. First, India would not ask reciprocity, but gives and 
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accommodates what it can in good faith and trust; second, no 
South Asian country should allow its territory be used against the 
interests of another; third, no country should interfere in the internal 
affairs of another; fourth, all should respect the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of each other, and finally, should settle all disputes 
through peaceful bilateral negotiations.205 
 Up to the present, India has resisted abetting separatist movements within 
Pakistan, as it is a zero-sum game. This policy is also in tune with Indian desire 
to be seen as a responsible international player. India will accordingly have to 
explore other options to stop Pakistan from supporting LIC. While many may call 
this policy timid and passive, it is likely to pay off in the long run. 
6. Mobilize International Support  
 India should mobilize international support to compel Pakistan to change 
its strategy of using LIC, as a means to wrest Kashmir from India.  The 
international pressure should stem from the knowledge that LIC breeds 
insurgents and terrorists, who are not only a threat to India but also to the rest of 
the world.   Many may attribute the non-use of military power by India, to contain 
LIC by Pakistan, even under extreme provocation, as political timidity206. India's 
low-key response is mostly in tune with its long held position of restraint and 
avoidance of escalation. This contrast in policies must itself make the 
international community to take action against Pakistan, and bring it back to 
acceptable standards of behavior. United States and China will have key roles in 
moderating the behavior of Pakistan towards itself, and its immediate neighbors, 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan began its support to LIC, as a conscious strategy to attain its 
objective of getting Kashmir back from India, right from the time of its 
independence.  In the last two decades it raised the stakes, by increasing the 
level of support to both the Kashmiri separatists, and to its own cadres fighting 
across the borders.  India took the better part of 1990s to contain the situation in 
Kashmir by effective counter insurgency operations and better governance. In 
the period post "9/11", Pakistan was compelled into supporting the United States 
in its global war on terror.  Pakistan was forced into fighting the very same 
Taliban cadres it had trained, and was also under pressure to stop its actions in 
Kashmir. A combination of some of these events, created a situation in which the 
militants saw Pakistan as the enemy within, and began targeting the state 
apparatus.   
Pakistan's continued support to the United States and the United States 
unabated drone strikes in Pakistan territory have further complicated matters for 
both the military and the political elite. In the ensuing confusion, the radical 
Islamic militants groups began causing havoc within Pakistan by targeting the 
military and the minorities.  Sectarian violence reached new proportions with 
Shias and Sunnis targeting each other's mosques with a vengeance. Radical 
Islamist groups are exploiting this uneasy situation, and are gaining in strength at 
the cost of democratically elected government.   Pakistan today is in a state of 
turmoil, largely because of the choices it made, and the decisions it took in the 
last two decades.  There is a partial realization that some of its policies are not 
paying off, but any change in course is considered suicidal by both the politicians 
and the military.207  Under these circumstances, the driver for change must 
emerge from within Pakistan.  With the key stakeholders, i.e. the politicians and 
the military not ready to rock the boat, it will have to be the general population, 
which has to revolt and demand for change.  Any change of this nature, can only 
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be accomplished by complete overhaul of the existing system.  But, any situation 
like this is likely to bring the military back into power, in the name of restoring a 
hopeless situation. Herein lies the dilemma for Pakistan. 
The emergence of a true democracy in Pakistan is the only way out of the 
mess that it is in.  Thereafter, if Pakistan proceeds on the path of normal political 
and economic development, there would be lesser need for using LIC and Islam 
for political and strategic goals.  This path obviously entails giving up the cause 
of Kashmir, and the only incentive for this change would have to be avoidance of 
"self-destruction" of Pakistan.  After all the survival of Pakistan is more important 
than the acquisition of Kashmir.208  
Pakistan, in spite of being a State Sponsor of Terrorism has been able to 
remain afloat due to diplomatic support and economic aid of the United States.  
As soon as this lifeline is removed, pressures from within and outside Pakistan 
will start affecting the future of this Islamic nuclear country.   It is important for 
both United States and India, to help Pakistan become a moderate and forward-
looking state.  This will automatically lower the tensions in South Asia and reduce 
the threat of terrorism worldwide.  Pakistan will have to begin first by dismantling 
its infrastructure of LIC and refocus its energy on its own development. It is 
ultimately in the interest of  Pakistan to help itself, to come out of the mess that it 
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